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The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A




This Article reveals the underappreciated role of liability rules in constitutional
law. Conventional constitutional theory insists that constitutional entitlements re-
quire, by their nature, property rule protection. That is, they can only be taken with
the owner’s consent; nonconsensual takings can be enjoined. This Article shows
that many constitutional values are in fact protected by liability rules, which allow
for forced transfers followed by payment of compensation. Substantive entitle-
ments form one dimension of constitutional law. The various ways in which they
are protected against transfers form the second dimension. The full picture of
constitutional law only emerges from looking at both.
The Article locates liability rules in diverse areas such as the First Amendment
prior restraint doctrine, the Third Amendment, Fourth Amendment search and
seizure rules, the Due Process Clauses, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Excessive
Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Thus constitutional theory’s insistence
on property rule protection fails account for how some constitutional values are
actually protected. This Article develops a richer understanding of the relation-
ship between constitutional remedies and constitutional entitlements. The trans-
action cost perspective on constitutional law reveals previously unnoticed connec-
tions between various doctrines, and provides a new criterion for evaluating their
strengths and weakness.
This Article also presents new evidence that the Constitution does not require
property rule protection and can be satisfied with liability rules. It shows that the
oft-overlooked Third Amendment explicitly mandates property rule protection for
the entitlement it defines. This property rule, together with the Takings Clause’s
explicit liability rule, shows that for other entitlements the Constitution does not
require any particular form of protection. The one explicit property rule and the
one explicit liability rule define the second dimension in constitutional lawrengths
and weakness.
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 This Article reveals the underappreciated role of liability rules in constitutional 
law. Conventional constitutional theory insists that constitutional entitlements require, by 
their nature, property rule protection. That is, they can only be taken with the owner’s 
consent; nonconsensual takings can be enjoined. This Article shows that many 
constitutional values are in fact protected by liability rules, which allow for forced 
transfers followed by payment of compensation. Substantive entitlements form one 
dimension of constitutional law. The various ways in which they are protected against 
transfers form the second dimension. The full picture of constitutional law only emerges 
from looking at both. 
 
 The Article locates liability rules in diverse areas such as the First Amendment 
prior restraint doctrine, the Third Amendment, Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
rules, the Due Process Clauses, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Excessive Bail Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment. Thus constitutional theory’s insistence on property rule protection 
fails account for how some constitutional values are actually protected. This Article 
develops a richer understanding of the relationship between constitutional remedies and 
constitutional entitlements. The transaction cost perspective on constitutional law reveals 
previously unnoticed connections between various doctrines, and provides a new 
criterion for evaluating their strengths and weakness. 
  
 This Article also presents new evidence that the Constitution does not require 
property rule protection and can be satisfied with liability rules. It shows that the oft-
overlooked Third Amendment explicitly mandates property rule protection for the 
entitlement it defines. This property rule, together with the Takings Clause’s explicit 
liability rule, shows that for other entitlements the Constitution does not require any 
particular form of protection. The one explicit property rule and the one explicit liability 
rule define the second dimension in constitutional law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
    
 Constitutional law exists in two fundamentally distinct dimensions, only one of 
which is commonly recognized. The first dimension is that of substantive entitlements. 
The second dimension involves remedies -- the manner in which entitlements are 
protected against forced transfers or destruction. A constitutional norm can only be fully 
understood when viewed simultaneously in both dimensions, where rights and remedies 
interact to create the norm as it is experienced in practice. 
 The creation of a substantive entitlement does not dictate how it should be 
protected, as Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s article Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability Rules: One View of the Cathedral (hereinafter “The 
Cathedral”) famously showed in the private law context.1 Entitlements can be protected 
through property rules or through liability rules. Under a property rule, an entitlement can 
only be transferred with the owner’s consent. The entitlement must be purchased in 
advance of a transfer; injunctions and punitive damages are available to prevent coercive 
takings. Liability rules, by contrast, permit nonconsensual takings of entitlements, but 
award the original owner compensatory money damages in a subsequent judicial 
proceeding. The choice between liability and property protection depends on whether 
transaction costs are high enough to prevent voluntary transfers of entitlements when 
such transfers would be socially efficient. If transaction costs are relatively high, liability 
rules work best. 
                                                 
1 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) [hereinafter, Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral]. 
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 Constitutional theory has almost entirely ignored this two-dimensional 
understanding of rights and their relation to remedies.2 Constitutional entitlements are 
commonly thought to require, by their very nature, nothing short of property rule 
protection.3 In this view, the government can never lawfully take constitutional rights 
without the owner’s consent. Someone facing a nonconsensual rights deprivation is 
presumptively entitled to an injunction.4 Money damages for constitutional violations are 
resorted to as a second-best remedy when it is too late for an injunction. However, 
                                                 
2 One notable exception is Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting, 
Purchasing, and Possibly Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1143 (1999). While Prof. 
Merrill considers the possibility of constitutional liability rules as a theoretical exercise, the present Article 
actually identifies examples of existing constitutional liability rules.  
3 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 115 & 
n.112 (1997) (arguing that constitutional rights should not be transformed into “takings-clause-like 
‘liability’ rights” because it would allow the government to “cynically treat violations of sacred 
constitutional rights merely as the cost of doing business”); David Luban, The Warren Court and the 
Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. CR.-CL. L. REV. 7, 19-20 & n.36 (1999) (arguing the “only conceivable 
notion of constitutional rights” entails “prophylactic protection from potential infringements,” and that the 
Warren Court subscribed to such a property-rule view of constitutional rights); Vicki C. Jackson, The 
Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 93 (1988); Jules 
L. Coleman & Judy Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1339-40 (1986) (“If 
rights entail or secure liberties. . . . [t]he very idea of a ‘liability rule entitlement,’ that is of a right secured 
by a liability rule, is inconceivable.”); James Boyd White, Forgotten Points in the “Exclusionary Rule” 
Debate, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1278 n.21 (1983) (“Damages [for unlawful searches and seizures] would 
be a kind of forced exchange, and however appropriate that may be in a commercial context where all 
things are in principle exchangeable, it would be incompatible with the idea of a right specifically against 
the government.”); Walter F. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1532, 1563 (1972) (arguing that while liability protection might be appropriate for private law rights, 
“it is inconsistent with a constitutional system”). 
4 See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (“It is established practice for this Court to sustain the 
jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution.”) (citing 
cases); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 690 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part) (“[C]onstitutional violation[s] may be enjoined if and when discovered.’); Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 404 (1977) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting the “presumed 
availability of federal equitable relief against threatened invasions of constitutional interests.”); Mitchum v. 
Hurt, 73 F.3d 30, 35 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 342, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (same). See also, Richard H. Seamon, The Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76 WASH. L. 
REV. 1067, 1135 n.325 (2001) (observing that constitutional rights are presumptively protected by property 
rules); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONN. L. REV. 
961, 1008 & n.205 (1998) (“In constitutional law…equitable relief has become the standard remedy for 
most constitutional violations, and one which is available essentially as a matter of right.”).  
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limiting remedies to ex post money damages is widely thought of as incompatible with 
constitutional values. 
 In a previous article, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass 
Detentions,5 I challenged this dominant view of constitutional law by showing that 
liability rules can be the best way of protecting constitutional rights in the same 
circumstances that recommend liability rules in private law – when transaction costs are 
high enough to block socially beneficial exchange. Liability Rules for Constitutional 
Rights demonstrated the potential utility of liability rules by pointing to a situation – mass 
detentions in emergencies – where transaction costs can render property rules 
dysfunctional. Thus Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights was primarily normative: it 
showed that a particular entitlement currently protected by property rules might, in some 
situations, be better suited to a liability rule.6 
This Article has a broader agenda. It casts much of constitutional law in a new 
light by revealing how it already uses liability rules. The Article locates liability rules in 
the First Amendment prior restraint doctrine, the Third Amendment, Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure rules, the Due Process Clauses, the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, the Self Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Excessive 
Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Thus constitutional theory’s insistence on 
property rule protection fails to describe how constitutional values are actually protected. 
These doctrines and provisions take on new depth and meaning when one becomes aware 
                                                 
5 See Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 755 (2004) [hereinafter, Kontorovich, Liability Rules]. 
6 Sovereign immunity may be a barrier to actions for money damages and thus to liability rules. Money 
damages are recoverable in suits against municipalities, Bivens suits against federal officers, and when the 
sovereign has waived its immunity, as the federal government has done for Takings claims. The discussion 
in this Article leaves immunity issues to one side. 
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of their liability rule component. The transaction cost perspective on constitutional law 
reveals previously unnoticed connections and similarities between various doctrines, as 
well as providing a new criterion for evaluating their strengths and weakness. An 
awareness of the transaction cost underpinnings of these doctrines should help courts to 
better administer them.7  
 In response to the widely-held view that the Constitution itself mandates property 
rule protection for all entitlements, this Article presents new evidence that liability rules 
are entirely consistent with the Constitution. It shows that the oft-overlooked Third 
Amendment explicitly mandates property rule protection for the entitlement it defines. It 
is the only constitutional provision to do so. This is essential to understanding 
constitutional remedies, yet it has heretofore gone unnoticed. The Third Amendment’s 
explicit property rule, read together with the Takings Clause’s explicit liability rule, 
shows that the Constitution does not require either type of protection for other 
entitlements. The one explicit property rule and the one explicit liability rule define the 
second dimension of constitutional law.  
 Part I sets up the theoretical foundations of the Article by explaining the concepts 
of liability and property rules, and their relation to transaction costs. It also introduces a 
concept essential for applying these in the constitutional context – the concept of ex post 
or “public” transaction costs. These are the costs attendant to judicially determining 
damages for rights violations, and they are generally higher for constitutional than for 
private law entitlements. Liability rules are appropriate when, roughly speaking, ordinary 
                                                 
7 To be sure, the choice between liability and property rules in constitutional law, as in private law, is not 
solely a function of transaction costs; it can also be a response to other types of concerns. But noting the 
difference in how entitlements are protected opens the door to understanding what, if anything, motivates 
the differential treatment. 
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transaction costs are high but ex post transaction costs are relatively low. Ex post 
transaction costs are particularly high for liberty entitlements, which explains why they 
are almost never protected by liability rules. 
 Part II discusses the only two constitutional entitlements that explicitly call for 
liability or property rule protection. This Part reveals how the Third Amendment 
explicitly announces a property rule for the entitlement it defines. The discovery of the 
Third Amendment’s property rule has several important implications for constitutional 
law. It shows – when considered alongside the well-known liability rule in the Takings 
Clause -- that other constitutional entitlements can be protected by either property or 
liability rules, as the courts and Congress see fit. Part II also shows that the Third 
Amendment calls for liability rule protection in certain high-transaction cost 
circumstances. Thus the Constitution itself suggests that the decision about how an 
entitlement should be protected should turn at least in part on the transaction costs that 
would be involved in its transfer. Finally, this Part explains that the Third Amendment’s 
property rule has important implications for the much-debated question of regulatory 
takings: it suggests that compensation is required for partial takings of property. 
 Part III shows how several constitutional provisions and doctrines create liability 
rules for individual rights. These doctrines allow the government to provide a judicial 
hearing only after it acts, thus creating de facto liability rules. This Part focuses on two 
examples: procedural due process under the Due Process Clauses, and Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure rules. The Supreme Court has held that the government 
does not violate due process entitlements if it provides remedies only after taking an 
entitlement. These “adequate postdeprivation remedy” cases create liability rule 
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protection for procedural due process rights. Similarly, under the Fourth Amendment, if 
the government is allowed to conduct unwarranted searches and seizures, a wrongful 
search will in practice have to be remedied with money damages, characteristic of 
liability rules. 
 Part IV explains how the government’s entitlements are protected by liability 
rules in the free speech and bail contexts. The government can prohibit speech that falls 
outside the First Amendment’s protection, such as obscenity. Thus the government has a 
substantive anti-speech entitlement. Yet under the prior restraint doctrine, this entitlement 
cannot be protected through injunctions, but only with ex post remedies. Similarly, the 
government has the power to detain criminal defendants until trial. Yet the Bail Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment effectively allows defendants to “buy out” the pre-trial detention 
entitlement. Part IV also examines whether these liability rules are justified by 
transaction costs. It concludes that the bail liability rule may be grounded in transaction 
costs, but the prior restraint liability rule is not. 
 
I. TRANSACTION COSTS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 
 This Part explains liability rules, property rules and transaction costs, terms that 
will be used throughout the rest of the Article. These concepts have been explored in a 
vast body of private law literature since the publication of The Cathedral,8 and so they 
                                                 
8 For some notable contributions in the law and economics literature, see Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, 
Correlated  Values in  the Theory of  Property and  Liability  Rules, 32 J. LEG. STUD. 121, 123 (2003); 
Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and Liability Rules: Broken 
Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267, 291-92 (2002); Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 Yale L.J. 2149 (1997); Louis Kaplow & Stephen 
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); 
Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability 
Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235 (1995); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability 
Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 442 (1995); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, 
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE  L.J. 1027 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art1
Kontorovich                                                                                                     Constitution in Two Dimensions (draft m.s.) 
Page 9 of 74 
are only briefly sketched in Part I.A.9 Part I.A also explains what it means for a 
constitutional right to be transacted. Part I.B broadens and elaborates the concept of 
transaction cost to make it more relevant to constitutional entitlements. It explains that 
liability rules require a judicial valuation of the entitlement, which is itself costly. These 
are in effect of ex post transaction costs, that should be balanced against the ex ante 
transaction costs characteristic of property rules. Constitutional entitlements will 
generally be harder for courts to accurately value than private law entitlements. Part I.C 
pays special attention to liberty, which is one of the most difficult constitutional 
entitlements to monetize. As a result, liability rules will be more unwieldy for liberty than 
for other entitlements. Part I.D introduces formulae to determine when liability rule 
treatment is proper. It also presents a matrix that shows how combinations of ex post and 
ex ante transaction costs lead to liability rules for various constitutional entitlements. 
 
A. Property rules, liability rules, and constitutional transactions. 
 
 A property rule prevents entitlements from being transferred or destroyed without 
the consent of the owner. Because only voluntary exchanges are possible under this rule, 
they are presumed to be efficient. Both parties gain from the transfer of rights (and 
society gains with them), or else they would not have bothered with the transaction. The 
price at which the entitlement is transferred incorporates any idiosyncratic elements  of 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1995). In the non-economic vein, two divergent perspectives can be seen in Coleman & Krauss, supra note 
3, at 1339-40 (arguing that liability rules do not allow entitlements to create domains of individual 
autonomy); Dale Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 837 (1997) (arguing that the distinction between a property and a liability rule concerns whether it 
is appropriate rather than whether it is possible to take an entitlement without the owner’s consent).  
9 For concise descriptions of these concepts and reviews of the related literature, see Kontorovich, Liability 
Rules, supra note 5, at 763-68; Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 11-25 (2002); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 108 YALE L.J. 2175 (1997). 
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value (such as sentimental value).10 The property rule price is, by definition, the “true” 
value of the entitlement. Property rules ensure that entitlements wind up with their 
highest value user. 
 The advantages of property rules are realized only when transaction costs are low. 
Transaction costs can arise in myriad forms,11 all involving departures from the ideal of 
perfectly competitive markets.12 Transaction costs are commonly understood as costs of 
buying and selling, such as the cost of learning about the quality of goods and their 
prices; cost of reaching an agreement with a distant party or a party that drives a hard 
bargain (behaves strategically); the cost of writing and enforcing contracts, as well as the 
expected cost of the non-performance. In order to avoid circularity in the definition of the 
concept, one has to state in advance the circumstances that make these costs high or low.  
 Transaction costs are lower in territorially concentrated markets, in markets with 
large numbers of buyers and sellers, and markets for homogenous commodities and 
standard goods. The costs increase if small numbers of buyers and sellers are involved, if 
goods are customized or unique, or if the results of the deal are uncertain. Holdout, a 
particular type of transaction cost, occurs in situations where the uniqueness of each 
                                                 
10 See Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 1, at 1092. 
11 Surprisingly, law and economics scholars have yet to agree on a definition of transaction costs. For a 
description of these difficulties and a criticism of the reliance on transaction-costs in Coasean law and 
economics, see Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1674 (1989) 
(“When we turn to the theoretical definition of transaction costs, however, we encounter serious 
controversy among economists. Several economists have noted that the definition of transaction costs is 
elusive and contested.”). Measuring transaction costs is not easy either, at least for judges. See Todd J. 
Zywicki, Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law: An Institutional Comparison of 
Common Law And Legislative Solutions to Large-Number Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
961, 969 (1996) (discussing “the inability to measure transaction costs”). 
12 See Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 1, at 1109-10 &n.39. 
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parcel being purchased by a developer allows sellers to behave strategically.13 High 
transaction costs may cancel out the gains from exchange, and prevent otherwise efficient 
transactions from being consummated. Society has evolved many devices for lowering 
transaction costs so as to expand the amount of efficient exchanges. Liability rules is one 
of such devices.14  
 Liability rules allow a would-be buyer to bypass the original entitlement holder’s 
consent, and instead to coercively take the entitlement. However, the taker must pay 
compensation in an amount established by a court in a subsequent action for damages by 
the original entitlement holder.15 In the subsequent judicial proceeding, the court would 
attempt to award a sum that approximating the price that would have been paid under a 
property rule. The drawback of liability is that there is less confidence in the accuracy of 
a judicially-determined price than in a privately-determined one: approximating the 
market price is not always easy.16 If damages underestimate the private value of the 
entitlement, it will over-encourage takings of entitlements, and if the damages are too 
high, it would over-deter takings. Erroneous damages would also distort the entitlement-
holder’s incentives.  In either case, entitlements would not wind up in with their highest 
value user: the outcome will not be efficient.   
                                                 
13 Holdout is explained more extensively in the discussion of the Takings Clause, which is particularly 
concerned with avoiding this problem. See text accompanying notes 59-63, infra. 
14 See Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 1, at 1106. 
15 See id. at 1107. The price of the entitlement can also be established by legislation, an administrative 
agency, or other third-party. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 3 & n.8. 
16 This account leaves to one side the supposed psychic differences between liability and property rules, 
such as the displeasure people may experience at having an entitlement forcibly taken. This displeasure 
would ideally be compensable under a liability rule, though it is clear that monetizing such displeasure is 
also quite difficult.  
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 A few words should be said about the “transaction” of constitutional entitlements 
because unlike those in private law, one does not normally think of them as being 
transacted.17 A constitutional transaction occurs under a property rule when the 
government obtains a voluntary waiver of the individual’s rights. Such transactions can 
be done in exchange for some consideration from the government, as in the case of plea 
bargains, or gratis, without consideration, as is usually the case in consensual searches. 
Constitutional transactions within the meaning of this Article also occur when the 
government condemns an entitlement through the judicial process.18 If the government 
does not secure a plea bargain, it can still seek a conviction; if it does not obtain consent 
to a search, it can seek a warrant. Similarly, in private law, forcible destruction of 
another’s property is a “transaction” for which the taker may be liable in tort for 
conversion. A transaction occurs regardless of whether the entitlement is transferred to 
the taker or destroyed by him,  
 The jury or judge can be seen as alternative sources of ex ante consent for a taking 
of constitutional entitlements. The “negotiation” with the jury is the process of proving 
the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The ex ante transaction costs are those of developing 
evidence and conducting a trial. Thus “constitutional transactions” under a property rule 
require the government to obtain the consent of the entitlement holder or a court in 
advance. This is not so different from the situation with private law entitlements. If 
Marshall believes that Taney’s farm belongs to Marshall, he can either negotiate with 
Taney out-of-court for a return of the land, or he can sue for possession. But because land 
                                                 
17 See Kontorovich, supra note 5, at 772 (explaining the concept of “constitutional transactions” in the 
criminal context). 
18 See Merrill, supra note 2, at 1143 (defining constitutional transactions as occurring when the government 
purchases, condemns, or “otherwise extinguish[es] constitutional rights”). 
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is protected by a property rule, Marshall cannot forcibly dispossess Taney without a prior 
court order.  
 
B. Valuation difficulties. 
 
 Liability rules require courts to put a monetary value on the taken entitlement. 
Doing so entails costs: both the costs of litigation, such as judicial salaries, legal fees and 
discovery. It also entails the costs of error arising from inaccurately assessed damages. 
These are the costs of doing the transaction through public rather than private processes.19 
This article will call the costs resulting from transferring entitlements under a liability 
rule “ex post transaction costs” to distinguish them from the traditional ex ante costs 
involved in voluntary transfers. Ex post transaction costs are a sum of administrative and 
error costs. Error arises from the difficulty of judicially determining the value of 
entitlements. The degree of error is measured by the difference between the judicial 
valuation of the entitlement and what the original entitlement holder would have sold it 
for. The cost of error arises from the inefficient incentives created by erroneous damages, 
which over-deter takings if set too high, and encourage too much taking if set too low. 
 When an entitlement is not traded in thick markets, or possesses elements of 
idiosyncratic value, it becomes more difficult and expensive to get an accurate judicial 
valuation. If the court errs in assessing damages it will result in undercompensation or 
overcompensation. Systematic error in either direction will create improper incentives. 
Thus the error costs of using liability rules increase as the difficulty of setting damages 
increases. The administrative costs increase too: a wider variety of evidence must be 
                                                 
19 See Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 766. 
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considered by the court when it deals with non-market entitlements than with 
entitlements that have a market-determined “price tag,” such as a commodity. 
 These considerations apply to liability and property rules in general. However, 
constitutional entitlements are, as a class, harder to value than most private law 
entitlements. First, there is no explicit market for most constitutional rights, and thus no 
obvious way to determine their value.20 Since individual constitutional rights are only 
good against the government, the market for such rights are monopsonistic. Plea 
bargaining creates a thick market for liberty rights under cloud of title (that is, the liberty 
entitlements face possible condemnation through trial and conviction). Yet plea 
agreements would be poor measures of the monetary value of defendants’ liberty because 
the plea does not trade between money and liberty. Rather, it trades between liberty and 
the potential loss of more liberty. Some constitutional rights are particularly hard to value 
not simply because there is no market in the narrow sense that the government is not 
purchasing them like it purchases widgets and tanks, but rather because no one is 
purchasing them. 
 Second, constitutional entitlements are often inchoate. It is not always obvious 
what interests a particular entitlement protects and thus which interests are compromised 
by its taking.21 Finally, there may be a high degree of variance in people’s subjective 
valuations of their constitutional entitlements, making it harder for courts to award truly 
compensatory damages for takings. Some constitutional entitlements are harder to value 
                                                 
20 See Merrill, supra note 2, at 1165 (“There is no established market price or other financial price for 
unreasonable government searches.”). 
21 See Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 773. 
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than others, with liberty interests posing perhaps the greatest problems. Thus they are 
also discussed separately in Part I.C.  
 The somewhat metaphysical term “incommensurability” is often used to describe 
the difficulty of valuing inchoate and non-market entitlements. Incommensurability is 
one of the main objections against considering the potential of liability rules in 
constitutional law. The argument begins, correctly, by observing that certain entitlements 
are much more difficult to monetize than others. From this, it concludes that any regime 
that depends on monetizing them is fundamentally flawed. The argument has several 
weaknesses. It treats a continuous variable -- the magnitude of error in a damage award – 
as discontinuous. Further, it does not consider this variable’s relation to others, such as 
the size of ex ante transaction costs. 
 Liability rules for takings of real property are uncontroversial because such 
entitlements are generally regarded as not incommensurable. Yet the market value of a 
house, which is the benchmark for just compensation, does not incorporate its sentimental 
worth to its present owners, an inchoate and unique value that is difficult to monetize. 
Indeed, “just compensation” for eminent domain, determined by market price, is usually 
less than the land was worth to owners. Had the market price exceeded their private 
valuation, they would have already sold the property themselves.22 This does not mean 
that real property is incommensurable. Usually, only a small portion of the value of the 
                                                 
22 See Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.): 
Compensation in the constitutional sense is . . . not full compensation, for market value is not the 
value that every owner of property attaches to his property but merely the value that the marginal 
owner attaches to his property. Many owners are “intramarginal,” meaning that because of 
relocation costs, sentimental attachments, or the special suitability of the property for their 
particular (perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, they value their property at more than its market value 
(i.e., it is not “for sale”). . . . The taking in effect confiscates the additional (call it "personal") 
value that they obtain from the property. 
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entitlement to its owner will be idiosyncratic or above the market value. The greater the 
proportion of private to market value, the greater the problems of judicial valuation. Thus 
“incommensurability” is not a discrete quality that some entitlements possess that 
immunizes them from standard transaction cost analysis. Rather, commensurability is a 
continuous variable. Even the degree of valuation error, in itself, yields no information 
about the desirability of liability rules. It must be considered in relation to the likely 
social gains the use of liability rules would allow, and the costs and benefits of the 
property rule alternative.  
 
C. Liberty entitlements. 
   
 Takings of material property sometimes receive compensation and sometimes 
they do not.23 Liberty entitlements are generally regarded as more important or 
fundamental than property entitlements. Yet in the few situations where takings of liberty 
are permitted, such as military conscription or jury service, compensation is not 
constitutionally required.24 The switch is always drastic, from a robust property rule to 
nothing.25 To be sure, outside of the criminal context, ex ante transaction costs can 
prevent efficient outcomes under property rules for liberty entitlements. Indeed, when 
uncompensated takings of liberty are allowed, it is usually because ex ante transaction 
                                                 
23 See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1333 & n.1 (1991) 
(observing the existence of a “gray area [of cases] where in which it will be difficult to predict whether 
compensation is constitutionally required”). See also, Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: 
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1183-1201 
(1967) (“‘Taking’ is, of course, constitutional law’s expression for any sort of publicly inflicted private 
injury for which the Constitution requires payment of compensation.”).   
24 Cf. Gary Lawson & Guy Siedman, Taking Notes: Subpoenas and Just Compensation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1081, 1097 (1999) (“[T]he rule allowing the government to seize certain personal services [for military 
service, road repairs, and in-court testimony] without compensation, if correct, is a historically justified 
exception from the normal conceptual reach of the Constitution’s just compensation requirement.”). 
25 Jurors and military draftees customarily receive some nominal payment, but it is not even close to fully 
compensatory damages. See Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 824. 
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costs are high. Thus, the lack of liability rule protection in these situations can best be 
explained by the difficulty of valuing liberty.26  
 1) Ex ante transaction costs usually low. 
 Individuals’ liberty entitlements are generally protected by property rules because 
in most situations in which the government seeks to condemn liberty entitlements, 
transaction costs do not pose insurmountable problems. Consider, for example, criminal 
prosecutions. The government deals with large numbers of separate defendants, and need 
not succeed in striking plea deals or securing convictions against all of them.27 This is 
because the individual entitlement holders are fungible. Unless the government has an 
unrealistic goal of a 100% conviction or plea bargain rate, it would do well enough by 
successfully negotiating the transfer of some the individuals’ entitlements. Assuming that 
the harm caused by those charged with a given crime is more or less the same across a 
large number of cases, it does not much matter which defendants the government 
succeeds in making a deal with. If one accused murderer does not enter a plea bargain, 
another one might. This undermines the ability of both of them to extract surplus, thus 
preventing the holdout problems that can make property rules troublesome.28 In other 
words, the entitlements are not in effect held jointly. A refusal to deal by one entitlement-
holder cannot not frustrate the entire scheme – unlike in many eminent domain situations. 
                                                 
26 The habeas corpus remedy does not create a property rule for liberty entitlements. The writ is only 
available to those already in custody. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2003).  Thus it does not in itself prophylacticly 
prevent forcible takings of liberty, as would an injunction. Nor is habeas a liability rule, as a successful 
petition results in release but not money damages for the illegal detention already suffered. Thus perhaps 
habeas can be seen as creating a partial property rule: it provides property rule protection against 
particularly long takings of liberty. 
27 See Merrill, supra note 2, at 1158-59 (explaining that plea bargaining can be seen as “taking place in a 
relatively low transaction cost setting” because there are only two parties to the negotiation, both parties 
have information through counsel and “a viable alternative” to making a deal). 
28 See Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 787-89. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Kontorovich                                                                                                     Constitution in Two Dimensions (draft m.s.) 
Page 18 of 74 
Moreover, imperfect information and a lack of time will not systematically prevent 
successful prosecution or plea bargaining, as extensions are routinely given under the 
Speedy Trial Act to allow the government to develop its case.29 
 Yet in some situations involving liberty entitlements – such as such as quarantines 
and compulsory vaccination, military conscription, and mass detentions during national 
security emergencies -- the ex ante transaction costs are high enough to make property 
rules dysfunctional. Constitutional law authorizes the abandonment of property rule 
protection in such situations.30 This Part will use compulsory jury service to illustrate the 
potential existence of prohibitive transaction costs in a context where uncompensated 
forcible takings of liberty are permitted as a matter of course. 
 2) Jury service: an example of high ex ante transaction costs? 
 Jury service is an almost entirely uncompensated taking of liberty. Why abandon 
property rule protection here? Certainly the government could get all the jurors it needs 
through conventional labor markets, just as the government gets all the clerks, janitors, 
and executives it needs, and just as film companies manage to get short-term work from 
extras. In classical Athens, payment was provided for jury service, set at roughly the cost 
of day’s barley ration for an average family.31 As a result, no compulsion was required to 
fill several-hundred member juries; indeed, prospective jurors lined up each morning for 
                                                 
29 See J. Andrew Read, Open-Ended Continuances: An End Run Around the Speedy Trial Act, 5 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 733, 736-37 (1997). 
30 See Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 780. Compensation is paid to conscripts, and in rare 
cases to those subject to compulsory vaccination and to national security detainees (as in the case of the 
Japanese interments). However, such payment is not considered to be constitutionally required, and does 
not even attempt to approximate “just compensation.” Id. at 824. 
31 See JOSIAH OBER, MASS AND ELITE IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY, AND THE POWER OF 
THE People 143 (1989) (discussing purchasing power of the three-obol wage for jury service).  
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the chance to serve.32 If today a court advertised “jurors wanted, will pay $12/hr.”, there 
would be no shortage of job-seekers at the courthouse door. 
 The problem might be one of adverse selection. A market system would result in 
juries composed largely of unskilled or not-very-skilled people -- those who sell their 
time at the lowest prices. This might not result in the kind of jury society wants. 
Furthermore, one can imagine mitigating the problem by offering a schedule of wages: 
for example, $12 an hour for high school graduates and $30 for college graduates. This 
would create a more mixed jury. However, even with differential payment, voluntary 
jurors would be quite different from the rest of society in at least one potentially 
important way: they would be those people who particularly enjoy being jurors. Those 
who derive non-pecuniary utility from jury service would be more willing to accept jury 
service at a given price than those who enjoy it less. The jury system may be wary of 
people who like being jurors more than the average person does. If good jurors are those 
who, like Socrates’ ideal guardians of a city, will only exercise power if forced to by 
law,33 then compulsory service is a necessary response to bargaining problems. Under a 
property rule, those who like being jurors would serve repeatedly. Such a 
professionalization of jury service was one of the chief complaints against the voluntary 
jury system in classical Athens.34 Of course, it is far from obvious that the compulsory 
jury service principle is based on such concerns. For one, peremptory challenges allow 
                                                 
32 See id. at 142; ARISTOPHANES, THE WASPS (describing prospective jurors lining up to be chosen). 
33 See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, Allan Bloom, trans. (2d ed. 1991). 
34 Aristophanes’ satire The Wasps portrays juries as being composed of citizens who particularly enjoyed 
passing judgment on others, primarily bitter old men who do nothing but serve on juries. See 
ARISTOPHANES, supra note 32. See also, OBER, supra note 31, at 143-44 (describing social composition of 
Athenian jury and suggesting that Aristophanes somewhat overrepresented the predominance of the old). 
Cf. DANIELLE S. ALLEN, THE WORLD OF PROMETHEUS: THE POLITICS OF PUNISHING IN DEMOCRATIC 
ATHENS 129-31 (2000) (describing traditional view that The Wasps is a criticism of the kind of juries that 
serve for pay, and suggesting this was only incidental to Aristophanes’ concerns about the jury). 
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lawyers to create juries that do not particularly reflect society. Moreover, those who 
suffer particular disutility from jury service are given numerous ways out. Yet under the 
assumptions just described, these would be the people that society would want as jurors. 
 The compulsory jury service example highlights an important point about 
transaction cost analysis of constitutional rules. Property rules work poorly when 
bargaining is costly relative to the benefits of reaching a deal. In non-market situations 
like jury service, it is not obvious how to define the social benefit. Whether ex ante 
transaction costs would hobble the jury system depends on the purpose of the jury system 
itself. If the benefit of using a jury arises from it being composed of a diverse group of 
amateurs, then compulsion is necessary.  
 
 3) Ex post transaction costs always high. 
 Even among constitutional entitlements, those involving liberty interests are 
particularly difficult for courts to value. Liability rules for such entitlements will be 
justified only in unusual circumstances. Individual liberty is not traded in markets; 
indeed, such commerce is illegal. As a result, courts cannot look to market prices to 
establish damages. Moreover, deprivations of liberty will often entail significant 
emotional costs. While the tort system sometimes provides redress for psychic injuries, 
there is little confidence that such awards are well-proportioned to the injury. 
Furthermore, the proof of such injuries is expensive, involving testimony from the injured 
party, friends and relatives, and experts. Finally, legislated schedules of damages would 
fail to achieve accurate compensation. The extent of the injury caused by a deprivation of 
liberty for a given period varies greatly from person to person, depending on their 
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opportunity costs of time, their subjective attitudes toward confinement, and the 
conditions in which they are confined. 
 To be sure, some component of the injury, such as lost wages, can be accurately 
valued. Similarly, for unlawful seizure of property, some component can be accurately 
valued, such as the rental value of the property. The difference is that with liberty 
interests, the portion of the injury susceptible to objective valuation is a relatively small 
proportion of the total loss. Thus constitutional law’s reluctance to afford anything other 
than property rule protection to the liberty entitlement is not a consequence of liberty 
being more sacred or important than property.35 Rather, it is a consequence of liberty 
being harder to value in ex post judicial proceedings. 
 As an aside, it is instructive to consider how liberty interests are protected by the 
European Union. The European Convention on Human Rights requires that states provide 
monetary compensation to those deprived of their liberty in contravention of the 
Convention; it does not provide for injunctive relief.36 The European Court of Human 
Rights has held that member nations must pay compensation for any encroachments on 
the Convention’s liberty entitlement.37 The compensation requirement, combined with 
                                                 
35 Cf. Robert Brauneis, Treanor’s Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 907, 927 n.116 (1998) (“We do not usually think of 
liberty as a commodity subject to eminent domain.”). 
36 See Art. V., par. 5. (“Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the 
provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”). Article V provides that  an 
individual cannot be “deprived of his liberty” except when detained on the basis of “reasonable suspicion 
of having committed an offence,” Art. V., par. 1(c), or after conviction for a crime.” Art. V. par. 1(a). The 
Convention also described several other miscellaneous circumstances that make detention permissible, such 
as immigration cases, quarantines, and the confinement of the intoxicated or mentally ill. Id. par.1(e)-(f). 
37 See, e.g., Yankow v. Bulgaria, Application no. 39084/97, par. 195-198 (First Sec. Dec. 11, 2003); 
Brogan v. United Kingdom, (A/145-B), 11 EHRR 117, 137-38, pars. 66-67 (1989):  
The government argued . .  that “lawful” for the purposes of the various paragraphs of Article 5 
is to be construed as essentially referring back to domestic law and in addition as excluding any 
element of arbitrariness. It concluded that even in the event of a violation being found of any of 
the first four paragraphs, there has been no violation of paragraph (5) because the applicants' 
deprivation of liberty was lawful under Northern Ireland law and was not arbitrary. . . The Court, 
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the Court’s strict exhaustion-of-domestic-remedies rules, means the Convention protects 
liberty entitlement with a liability rule. The Court does not enjoin unlawful detentions, 
but rather orders ex post compensation. However, the Court frequently suspends the 
compensation requirement, holding that the symbolic value of declaring that rights have 
been violated itself compensates for most of the injury.38 The use of such declaratory 
decisions in lieu of compensation is at least partially due to the difficulty of valuing the 
entitlement (it may also manifest an institutional concern that the Court’s authority would 
be undermined if a sovereign state refused to pay a judgment for money damages). 
 4) The limits of liability rules for liberty entitlements. 
 The great difficulty of valuing liberty suggests that a transaction cost approach to 
constitutional remedies should carefully distinguish it from other entitlements, 
particularly when a constitutional provision protects liberty alongside more readily 
monetizable interests (for example, the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause). 
The same ex ante transaction costs that recommend liability rules for other entitlements 
                                                                                                                                                 
like the Commission, considers that such a restrictive interpretation is incompatible with the 
terms of paragraph 5 which refers to arrest or detention “in contravention of the provisions of 
this article.” 
Indeed, the Court has ruled that even when the government has reasonable grounds to believe that 
particular individuals are involved in terrorist activities, it must pay compensation if it administratively 
detains them for at least four days without allowing any judicial review of the detention during that initial 
period. See Brogan, par. 62 (“The Court thus has to conclude that none of the applicants was either brought 
‘promptly’ before a judicial authority or released ‘promptly’ following his arrest [as required by Article 
5(3)]. The undoubted fact that the arrest and detention of the applicants were inspired by the legitimate aim 
of protecting the community as a whole from terrorism is not on its own sufficient to ensure compliance 
with the specific requirements of Article 5(3).”). 
38 See, e.g., O’Hara v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 32, ¶¶ 55, 59 (2002) (“The  Court  has  .  .  .  
found  a  breach  of  Article  5(3)  in  that  the  applicant  was  detained  for more than the acceptable period 
before being either released or brought before a court, and a breach of Article 5(5) in that he enjoyed no 
enforceable right to compensation in that respect. Nevertheless, the Court finds, in the circumstances of this 
case, that . . . these findings of a violation  constitute  in themselves  sufficient  just satisfaction  for  the  
non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant.”). 
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might not do so for liberty.39 However, the difficulty of ex post valuation does not obviate 
the need for scrutiny of ex ante transaction costs even when liberty entitlements are 
implicated. In some situations, like quarantines and compulsory vaccination, the 
transaction cost rationale is quite robust,40 and in some, like the wartime draft, it is 
plausible but perhaps not compelling.41 Others, like the peacetime draft, are in no way 
responses to bargaining problems, and thus appear suspect at least on economic 
grounds.42 With takings of liberty for jury service, a search for ex ante transaction costs 
focuses attention on the purposes of the jury system.43 
 
D. Balancing constitutional transaction costs. 
  
 Because both ex ante and ex post transaction costs are matters of degree, there 
will be situations where even high ex ante costs do not warrant an adoption of liability 
rules because ex post costs will be higher. This also suggests, perhaps counter-intuitively, 
that there may be cases with low ex ante transaction costs where liability rules would still 
perform at least as well as property rules, because ex post transaction costs would be even 
lower. An algebraic illustration will expand on these points.   
 T1 will represent what are commonly called transaction costs, and what this Part 
has described with greater specificity as “ex ante transaction costs,” or the costs of 
transferring rights voluntarily. T2 represents ex post transaction costs, or the cost of using 
                                                 
39 The distinction between liberty and other entitlements will reoccur throughout the Article. See Parts 
III.A.3, III.B.3, IV.C.3, infra. 
40 See Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 825-26. 
41 See id. at 827-30. 
42 See id. at 831; William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Just Compensation: Lessons from the 
Military Draft for the Takings Issue, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 28-49 (1996). 
43 See Part I.C.2, supra. 
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the judicial system to administer the transfer of entitlements, including error and 
administrative costs. Finally, S represents the total surplus from the transaction; it will 
always be positive in this discussion. That is, it is assumed that the proposed government 
action would be desirable in a zero transaction cost world. (If S < 0, the entitlement 
should be protected by inalienability rule, which would prohibit the government both 
from purchasing and from taking the entitlement.) 
 The choice between liability and property rules can be described through the 
interaction of these three terms, T1, T2, and S. If the goal is maximizing social surplus, 
property rules should be used when the costs of privately transferring the entitlement are 
lower than the costs of a transfer mediated by the judicial system. Thus when S-T1 > S-
T2, property rules should be used; when S-T2 > S-T1, liability rules should be used. When 
T1 > S and T2 > S, the proper response is an inalienability rule, that is, leaving the 
entitlement in its original position. 
 There is a wrinkle here that arises when T2 < T1 ≤ S. Normally, the remedial rule 
should be chosen to maximize the net social benefit. With private entitlements, it is 
assumed that the parties will be able to make side payments when increasing the size of 
the surplus happens to reduce one party’s share of it. Without such side-payments, parties 
would not agree to many efficient transactions, such as efficient contractual breaches. In 
the T2 < T1 ≤ S situation, ex ante transaction costs would not interfere with socially 
beneficial activities, but it would still be cheaper to transfer entitlements through the 
judicial process than through private bargaining. Thus the net benefit principle suggests 
that liability rules should be used in these cases. However, if judicial valuation is the 
most efficient method of transferring rights, it is not clear why an entitlement-holder 
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would ever resort to an injunction even if a property rule applied. The rights holder would 
not block the taking with an injunction, as he would understand that if the judicial system 
is cheaper, the savings could be spread between the parties through side-payments. 
 However, when constitutional entitlements are involved, the government might be 
unable to make side-payments that would allow the individuals to share in the surplus. 
This raises problems when the liability rule leaves the individual worse of (because it is 
undercompensatory) but is still  less socially costly than a property rule. Choosing the 
liability rule in this case might not make both parties better off than a property rule, and 
would thus fail the Pareto efficiency criterion. When side payments cannot be made, 
there will be little use for liability rules that are less than full compensatory if one thinks 
constitutional transactions must always satisfy the Pareto criterion, rather than simply 
maximize social surplus. The latter view may seem counterintuitive because 
constitutional entitlements are generally seen as individual rights. This suggests that only 
the individual’s private benefit should be considered, and not the net benefit. Yet 
constitutional law routinely delimits the substantive scope of individual rights by 
weighing their value to the individual against the cost of their exercise to society. That is 
the essence of the ubiquitous “balancing” tests relied on by the Supreme Court. The 
formulae above merely suggest a similar inquiry for the selection of remedies.  
 The matrix below illustrates how four different combinations of ex post and ex 
ante transaction costs can lead to different types of protection for constitutional 
entitlements. Explaining the precise reasons that particular entitlements fall in where they 
do in the matrix will be the work of the remainder of the Article. However, a few 
comments can be offered now so that the matrix can serve as a guide to the subsequent 
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discussion. The cost of transferring entitlements through the judicial system, such as error 
costs arising from valuation difficulties, is represented horizontally. These are the costs 
associated with liability rules. The cost attendant to transferring an entitlement through 
voluntary bargaining, as required under a property rule, is represented vertically. For 
purposes of illustration, the costs are divided simply into “high” and “low,” although in 
reality the costs on both side are continuous variables. In each square are constitutional 
entitlements that involve that particular rough combination of transaction costs. The 
italicized ones are protected by property rules, the others by liability rules. 
 
                                              EX ANTE TRANSACTION COSTS 
 High Low 
High Quarantines; 
 Prior restraint 
(1)
Default property rule: most of 
constitutional law 
(2)


















Low Eminent domain; 
Wartime quartering 
 (3)
Use immunity for compelled 
testimony  
 
Default property rule: most of 
constitutional law 
 
   (4)
 
 Square 2 is the obvious place to start. Most constitutional entitlements fall within 
square 2. Here, there are few barriers to bargaining between the government and the 
entitlement-holder, and the costs of judicial valuation are high due to the non-market 
nature of constitutional entitlements. For example, the government faces relatively low ex 
ante transaction costs in negotiating plea bargains, while judicial valuation of the liberty 
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entitlement would be highly inaccurate. Thus the liberty of criminal defendants receives 
property rule protection.44 
 Square 4 shows that even when ex ante transaction costs are not extraordinarily 
high, there may be situations where courts can value the entitlement precisely. In such 
situations, it is conceivable that the judicial process would be the most efficient 
mechanism for transferring entitlements, and thus allowing a forced taking may be more 
efficient. For example, the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination45 is 
protected by a liability rule with the grant of immunity, not money damages, as a fixed 
price for compelling grand jury testimony.46 Immunity gives full compensation to the 
protected right, which is why coerced testimony is permitted despite the Fifth 
Amendment. However, such situations will be quite rare. Thus property rules occupy 
most of square Four. Square 3 describes situations where ex ante transaction costs are 
particularly high, yet judicial valuation will be quite reliable. Eminent domain is the 
classic example; the ingredients are holdout problems on the ex ante side, and relatively 
easy ex post valuation because the real property has a market price.47 
                                                 
44 See Parts I.C.1, I.C.3, supra. 
45 U.S. CONST., amend V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.”) 
46  
In effect, the ability of the government to demand self-incriminating statements in legislative 
hearings and the like after offering the proper immunity means that -- like its Fifth Amendment 
companion, the Takings Clause -- the Self-Incrimination Clause in some ways states a liability 
rule, not a property rule. Once we see this, we should see the centrality of the scope of 
immunity: it establishes the all-important fixed price at which the government may buy a 
person’s testimony outside his own criminal case. 
Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 
93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 875 n.64 (1995) (citing Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 1). 
47 See Part II.A.2, infra. 
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 Finally, square 1 shows a difficult situation: ex ante transaction costs are 
prohibitively high, but the entitlement is very difficult for courts to monetize. In such 
cases, liability rules may still be used because the monetization difficulties may be 
smaller than the social benefit to be had from the rights-taking. One expects to see 
liability rules used in square 1 only when the ex ante transaction costs are extraordinarily 
high, or when society is threatened with a large, sudden injury (thus S is high).  
 
II. THE THIRD AMENDMENT AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE  
 
 
 The text of the Constitution says little about how the remedies for the substantive 
entitlements it defines. There is one well-known exception to this silence, where the 
Constitution explicitly mandates a particular remedy. The Just Compensation Clause48 
stipulates liability rule protection for the entitlement to not have one’s property taken for 
public use.49 Some scholars have argued that since only one constitutional provision 
specifies a remedial rule, it implies that the possible remedies for all other entitlements 
                                                 
48 See U.S. CONST., amend. V.  
49 Numerous scholars have observed that the Takings Clause involves a liability rule. See, e.g., Henry A. 
Span, Public Choice Theory and the Political Utility of the Takings Clause, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 11, 15 n.14 
(2003) (observing that the “Takings Clause acts as a ‘liability rule,’ as opposed to a ‘property rule.’”); 
James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, The Utility and Validity Of TDRs Under The Takings Clause and the 
Role Of TDRs in the Takings Equation Under Legal Theory, 11 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 45, 85-95 (2002); 
Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 8, at 1037; Amar & Lettow, supra note 46, at 875 n.64; 
Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 131 n.36 
(1992) (“The crucial point about the takings clause is that it creates only a ‘liability’ rule . . .  the issue is 
whether the government must compensate, not whether it can act.”). One court has described the Takings 
Clause in liability rule terms:  
There is a fundamental conceptual difference between a takings claim and a substantive due 
process claim. If the government pays just compensation, it may take property for public use 
under the Takings Clause. Due process protections, by contrast, define what the government may 
not require of a private party at all. It is the difference between a liability rule and a property 
rule. 
Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 658-59 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Becker, C.J.). 
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are left open to legislative and judicial experimentation.50 Yet because the one specified 
remedial rule is a liability rule, it also supports the opposite inference -- that property 
rules are implicitly required for all individual entitlements, except when, as with the 
Takings Clause, the Constitution expressly says otherwise.51 Commentators have failed to 
notice that there is another constitutional provision that explicitly chooses between 
liability and property rule protection for individual rights:52 the ban on quartering troops 
in peacetime found in the much-neglected Third Amendment.53 Unlike the Takings 
Clause, the Third Amendment mandates property rule protection. 
                                                 
50 See Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 815-17 (arguing that Constitutional text leaves 
remedies for violations of rights open except for instances, like the Takings Clause, that specifically 
provide an exclusive form of protection for a particular right); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, 
New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1779 (1991); Henry 
M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in 
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1366-70 (1953) (arguing that Congress’s control of organization and 
jurisdiction of the courts allows it to remove certain remedies for constitutional violations, including 
injunctive relief, so long as it keeps some remedy available). 
51 See John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 49, 76-77 (1996) (arguing that because liability rule only specified for takings of material property 
under Fifth Amendment, it implies that liability rules do not apply to the “information property” 
entitlement created by the First Amendment). 
52 Cf. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 796 (5th ed. 2003) (citations omitted): 
The text only refers explicitly to remedies in two instances. First, the remedy of habeas corpus is 
safeguarded against “suspension” by Congress. Second, the Just Compensation Clause dictates 
the remedy for interference with property rights amounting to a taking – compensation for the 
impairment of value. 
While the Just Compensation Clause creates a liability rule, the Suspension Clause should not be seen as 
ensuring a property rule. See U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). 
Habeas is itself a remedy, so the Constitution’s insistence on its availability simply ensures that whatever 
protection habeas provides shall not be eliminated except in narrow circumstances. The Safeguarding 
Clause is not a remedy at all, so it is neither a property nor a liability rule. As to the habeas remedy itself, it 
is something in between a liability and property rule. See note 26, supra. 
53 U.S. CONST., amend. III (“No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the 
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”). Very few cases raise 
Third Amendment claims for the obvious reason that quartering is no longer a particularly desirable means 
for the military to house troops. Even academics have paid  little attention to this “lost” amendment. See 
Custer County Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1042 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Judicial interpretation of the 
Third Amendment is nearly nonexistent.”). For one of the only modern cases entertaining a Third 
Amendment claim, see Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that Third 
Amendment claim by corrections officials whose government-owned housing units at prison were occupied 
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 Looking at the Third Amendment in two dimensions gives a new perspective on 
several important constitutional questions. First, it reveals the close relationship between 
the Third Amendment and the Takings Clause.54 Second, it offers an important new 
perspective on the contentious question of whether regulatory or partial takings are 
compensable. Finally, when taken together, the Third Amendment and the Takings 
Clause provide strong support for the view that all other constitutional provisions remain 
indifferent between liability and property rules. In short, the previously unnoticed 
property rule in the Third Amendment reinforces the argument that there is no general 
implication of property rule protection for constitutional entitlements. 
 
A. Liability and property rules in the Takings Clause. 
 
 1) Forms of protection. 
 The Takings Clause contains a liability rule, but also a property rule. The Just 
Compensation Clause announces liability as the exclusive form of protection for takings 
of property for public use, such as eminent domain. The government cannot be enjoined 
from seizing property under the clause, but it can be ordered to pay judicially-determined 
“just compensation” after the fact. This is the only individual entitlement in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
by National Guardsmen called in during strike by corrections officers survives summary judgment, but 
noting “the absence of any case law directly construing this provision”). 
54 Only a few lawyers have noted the similarities between the Third Amendment and the Takings Clause. 
The only extended discussion can be found in Tom W. Bell, The Third Amendment: Forgotten But Not 
Gone, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 117, 146-47 (1993) (discussing quartering in wartime as a type of 
taking for which “just compensation” would be required.). See also, Johnson v. United States, 208 F.R.D. 
148, 152 (W.D. Tex. 2001) (describing Third Amendment “as first cousin to the Fifth”); Andrew P. Morriss 
& Richard L. Stroup, Quartering Species: The “Living Constitution,” the Third Amendment, and the 
Endangered Species Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 769, 785 (2000) (“Just as that constitutional provision limits the 
government’s ability to take private property without compensation, so the Third Amendment layers an 
additional restriction upon the specific takings of land that fall within its purview.”). 
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Constitution that can never be protected with equitable remedies.55 By negative 
implication, when a taking is not for a “public use,” the owner can enjoin it – he enjoys 
property rule protection.56 Thus the robustness of the public use doctrine determines how 
much of the Fifth Amendment entitlement falls under a liability rule and how much under 
a property rule. Looser definitions of “public use” of the kind the Supreme Court has 
favored in recent decades57 increase the scope of the liability rule; narrower ones increase 
the scope of the property rule.58 
                                                 
55 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (“Equitable relief is not available to enjoin 
an alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation 
can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to the taking.”); Garvey, 256 F.3d at 1042 (“Injunctive 
relief is not available under the Fifth Amendment absent an allegation the purported taking is unauthorized 
by law.”). 
56 See Richard A. Epstein, A Clearer View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE 
L.J. 2091, 2112 (1997) [hereinafter, Epstein, A Clearer View]; Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and 
Speech: The Legacy of  Pruneyard v Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 34 (1997). The Takings Clause toggles 
between a property and liability rules depending on the existence of a given circumstance, namely, a public 
use. Thus the Takings Clause is the paradigmatic of what Profs. Bell and Parchomovsky have dubbed a 
“pliability rule” – one that combines elements of both property and liability rule protection. See Bell & 
Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 59-60 (“Arguably the most famous instance of pliability rule protection is 
provided by the law of eminent domain.”). See also, Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 5, at  768-70 
(explaining “pliability rules”); 
57 See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984) (“[W]here the exercise of the 
eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a 
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”) (emphasis added). In Midkiff, the Court 
unanimously upheld the use of the takings power to transfer land from one group of private landowners to 
another, with the asserted “public use” being the breaking-up of large concentrated land holdings. See id. at 
241-42; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 161 (1985) (observing that the Court has delivered a “mortal blow” to the public use limitation by 
making it broad enough “to allow the use of the eminent domain power to achieve any end otherwise 
within the authority of Congress”). However, some state courts have refused to treat the public use 
limitation as a dead letter. See Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 777 n.65 (citing cases). Most 
notably, the Michigan Supreme Court recently overruled its notorious Poletown case, and held that turning 
land over to private developers does not constitute a public use. See City of Wayne v. Hathcock, 2004 WL 
1724875 (Mich. July 30, 2004). State courts have also adopted narrower interpretations of the public use 
limitations in their state constitutions. See, e.g., Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898, 904 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) 
(“[W]e hold that when a proposed taking for a redevelopment project will result in private commercial 
ownership and operation, the Arizona Constitution requires that the anticipated public benefits must 
substantially outweigh the private character of the end use so that it may truly be said that the taking is for a 
use that is ‘really public.’”). 
58 See Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group 
Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 89 -90 (1998) (“When the Public Use Clause is weak, the Takings 
Clause acts primarily as a liability rule, allowing the condemnation of land whenever compensation (the 
liability for damages) is paid. Consequently, strengthening the public use requirement works to move the 
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 2) Transaction cost justification. 
 The Just Compensation Clause’s liability rule is a response to the high transaction 
costs associated with eminent domain. The nature of these costs has been exhaustively 
explored in previous scholarship and need only be sketched here.59 The problem arises 
when the government wishes to build a facility (such as an airport, road, military base, or 
dam) that requires the purchase of numerous parcels of land. Each parcel will likely be 
owned by a different individual. Under a property rule, the government would need to 
strike a deal with every landowner. If even one landowner refuses to sell, the entire 
project would be undone – one cannot have an airport runway with someone’s house in 
the middle of it. The problem becomes more acute if the project can only be built in a 
particular place due to natural geographic constraints (as with a dam) or to due to 
previous development (as with road and airport expansions).60 In short, it is the lack of 
close substitutes for the desired property that allows for hold-up. 
 Each individual landowner can exert veto power over the entire project, although 
he only controls a small portion of the total area to be developed. Thus each landowner 
might hold out for a large share of the surplus. When each property owner seeks to 
appropriate a disproportionate share of the surplus not all can be paid off and the project 
                                                                                                                                                 
Takings Clause toward the categorization of a property rule, prohibiting certain acquisitions of land without 
the consent of the owner regardless of whether compensation is paid.”); Epstein, A Clearer View, supra 
note 56, at 2113 (“The only sensible interpretation of the Public Use Clause is that it indicates that the state 
cannot always operate under a regime of take and pay, that is, with the benefit of an unconstrained liability 
rule. As an initial proposition, where the taking is not for a public use . . . then the individual property 
owner is once again protected by a property right, so that what can be taken can only be taken with 
consent.”). 
59 See, e.g. ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 289-90 (2000); Merrill, supra note 2, at 1159-
60; Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 1, at 1106-07. See also, Kontorovich, Liability Rules, 
supra note 5, at 765-66. 
60 Cf. Merrill, supra note 2, at 1159 (“[I]f the government’s needs are site-dependent . . . then it is likely 
that one or more landowners will bargain strategically. This will substantially increase the transaction costs 
of acquiring the desired land.”). 
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will fall through. Only by switching to a liability rule can the government break through 
the holdout problem. When the government can take first and then pay later, the original 
owners cannot hold the project hostage and seek to expropriate the surplus. Instead, each 
must content themselves with “just compensation.”   
 Thus the Takings Clause’s liability rule is a necessary response to a particularly 
severe holdout problem – but it is also an overbroad response that exceeds the transaction 
cost rationale. The liability rule is limited only by the “public use” requirement. Yet not 
all takings for public use face similar holdout problems. If the state needs to buy 100 
office chairs, it can purchase them in a competitive market of chair-makers. The assets 
are not unique: chairs of different manufacturers are close substitutes for one another. 
And the manufacturers do not posses veto power because the refusal to sell the 100th 
chair would not nullify the benefits of purchasing the first ninety-nine. Moreover, when 
real property is not involved, there are far fewer barriers to entry by other entitlement 
holders who would be willing to sell. Thus if the government used the Takings Clause to 
seize automobiles, or an automobile plant, it may well be for a public use, but not one for 
which a liability rule is appropriate.61 Assuming that the government internalizes the cost 
of its actions, this may not be much of a problem. When markets function well (that is, 
transaction costs are low), the government may well face higher ex post transaction costs 
in a reverse condemnation suit than in voluntary bargaining. Thus in low-transaction cost 
settings it may actually “prefer[] to negotiate a transfer of the asset under ordinary 
                                                 
61 See COOTER, supra note 59, at 289-90 (“[T]he state should not take property with compensation merely 
to produce public goods. In most cases, the state should buy property to produce public goods.”); Merrill, 
supra note 2, at 1159 (“If the government can accomplish its objectives by dealing with a competitive 
market of rightsholders, then it is unlikely that transaction costs will stand in the way of exchange.”).  
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property rule protection” rather than resort to the Takings Clause liability rule.62 This is 
consistent with how the government actually behaves: pencils, cars, cement and so forth 
are purchased rather than condemned under the Takings Clause.63 
  
B. Property and liability rules in the Third Amendment. 
 
 1) Forms of protection.  
 Like the Takings Clause, the Third Amendment contains both a liability rule and a 
property rule (and is thus also a “pliability rule”64). The peacetime quartering clause 
states a property rule; the wartime quartering clause announces a liability rule. In 
peacetime, quartering of troops can only be done with “the consent of the Owner.”65 The 
requirement that the original entitlement holder’s consent be secured ex ante is the 
defining characteristic of a property rule.66 Thus the government must negotiate with the 
owners of the properties where it wishes to quarter troops. The price the owners demand, 
if they agree at all, will reflect the full cost of the imposition. If the government tries to 
quarter troops without having consent, the owner could receive equitable relief. Punitive 
and compensatory damages would be awarded when it is too late for an injunction.67  
                                                 
62 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 63. 
63 See COOTER, supra note 59, at 289. 
64 See note 56, supra. 
65 U.S. CONST., amend. III (emphasis added). 
66 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 
111 YALE L.J. 357, 380 n.91 (“ ‘Property rules’ . . . require the consent of the entitlement holder before the 
entitlement can be taken.”); Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and 
the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 19 n.36 (1988) (“ ‘Property protection’ means that control 
over the asset can only be lost by consent.’”).   
67 See Bell, supra note 54, at 146 & n.228 (“Unless they levy punitive damages or other penalties against 
those responsible for this illegal and unconstitutional behavior, the Third Amendment’s consent 
requirement will offer no more protection from quartering than the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause.”). 
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 In wartime, however, the Third Amendment no longer requires the owner’s 
consent, and thus abandons property rule protection. Instead, the military can compel 
home owners to lodge troops, at least when authorized to do so by Congress. In wartime 
the government need not bargain with the homeowners when it wishes to quarter troops. 
The Amendment does not explicitly address whether the property rule is replaced with a 
liability rule, and thus owners receive compensation for wartime quartering. As a textual 
matter, it is not entirely clear whether the “law” prescribing quartering must satisfy the 
Just Compensation Clause, or whether the separate treatment of wartime quartering in the 
Third Amendment means it is a “special class of takings” not requiring compensation.68 
Tom Bell, apparently the only scholar to consider this question, reasonably concludes that 
the Takings Clause applies to wartime quartering, and so compensation is required.69 
Thus the Wartime Quartering clause, like the Just Compensation Clause, creates a 
liability rule.70 
 2) Transaction cost justification. 
 The divisions between the Fifth Amendment’s liability rule, the Third 
Amendment’s property rule, and the Third Amendment’s liability rule are consistent 
with, and perhaps motivated by, differences in the underlying transaction costs. The 
Takings Clause announces a liability rule because in many situations where the 
government seeks to take land for public use -- such as to build a road, fort or airfield -- 
                                                 
68 Id. at 147-48. 
69 Id. (“Applying the Ninth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment to the case at hand leads quite directly to 
one conclusion: the Third Amendment’s enumeration of a constitutional right to legal constraints on 
wartime quartering shall not be taken to deny or disparage a homeowner’s right to receive just 
compensation for a public taking.”).  
70 Bell notes that the liability rule for wartime quartering would not be fully compensatory. Id. at 149 (“It . . 
. does not appear that the victims of quartering could recover for what may be their most grievous injuries: 
being forced onto the street, seeing strangers occupy and ransack their houses, and homesickness.”). 
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holdout problems could scuttle the project if the entitlements are protected by property 
rules. The Peacetime Quartering Clause carves out a property rule exception to the broad 
liability rule in a discrete class of takings that do not face prohibitive transaction costs.   
 In peacetime, the military can use the rental market to house soldiers. If this is 
inadequate, it can construct barracks for them, which in peacetime is a perfect substitute 
for quartering in private homes. The private rental and construction markets are 
competitive; one potential seller can easily be substituted for another. Moreover, 
geographic considerations will not limit the government to a few specific sites for 
quartering troops, as they may for building roads and airports. Indeed, the Third 
Amendment contemplates the use of private homes, suggesting a situation in which a 
dispersion of troops is acceptable. Thus the military will not face the kind of hold-out 
problems that plague eminent domain. Assuming that the government internalizes costs, 
the Third Amendment ensures that troops will be housed in the most cost-effective 
manner. Troops will not be quartered in the homes of those who would be greatly 
inconvenienced or intimidated, as such people would not give their consent, or charge 
more than others would. In short, because transaction costs are low, the Third 
Amendment uses a property rule to prevent the government from bypassing well-
functioning markets and to ensure that the government takes into account idiosyncratic 
valuations of property. 
 In wartime, transaction costs suddenly become much higher. The number of 
soldiers needing accommodation rapidly increases, and this change may be greater than 
the rental and construction markets anticipated. Markets will not clear quickly enough 
because it may take time for new sellers to enter the market in response to the heightened 
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demand. The shortness of time is itself a source of transaction costs. Delay, particularly 
in wartime, may carry very high costs, including defeat.71 Moreover, in wartime, it will 
be more important for troops to be quartered together and in a few specified places, such 
as near staging grounds, ports, or places in need of defense. This gives monopoly power 
to the homeowners situated near those areas, and resurrects the holdout problems 
characteristic of eminent domain. Not surprisingly, the remedial rule in this situation 
switches back to liability, the one used for eminent domain.  
 Interestingly, one of the rare modern cases raising Third Amendment claims 
shows sensitivity to the transaction cost justification of the peacetime property rule. The 
plaintiffs claimed that overflights of their land by the Air Force constituted a “quartering” 
that required the consent of the landowners.72 The court said that the argument “borders 
on frivolous.”73 If consent were required for overflights, thousands of property owners in 
the flight path would have veto power over Air Force training. The consent of every 
landowner in the flight path would need to be secured; if even one owner withheld 
consent, successful bargains with all the others would be for naught. Thus each owner 
could hold out for the full value of the flights – the classic case in which property rules 
are dysfunctional.74 The court’s emphasis on the property owners’ holdout power 
                                                 
71 Similarly, the need to quickly fill the army’s ranks is the justification for the wartime draft, which allows 
the government to bypass labor markets. See Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 5, 827-28. The draft, 
however, is not a true liability rule. Conscripts’ salaries are well below compensatory in wartime, and the 
Supreme Court has suggested that the Constitution does not require any payment at all. Id. at 824.  
72 Garvey, 256 F.3d at 1043.  
73 Id.  
74  
The property Petitioners seek to protect is the airspace above their land. Taken to its logical 
extreme, Petitioners would have the United States military seek consent from every individual or 
entity owning property over which military planes might fly, and then design its training 
exercises to utilize only that airspace for which permission was granted, or else risk Third 
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suggests that the Third Amendment’s property rule protection might be abandoned even 
in peacetime in situations where, as in wartime, transaction costs would block activities 
with net social benefits.75 
 
C. The relationship between the Third and Fifth Amendment. 
 
 The Third Amendment and the Takings Clause are closely related provisions, and 
the former has much to say about the scope of the latter. While the Third Amendment is 
almost never mentioned in cases or scholarship, the Takings Clause is a subject of 
perpetual academic interest and litigation. A particularly contested question concerns 
regulatory or partial takings under the Fifth Amendment.76 In brief, the regulatory takings 
question is whether government action that substantially reduces but does not eliminate 
the value or usability of a property constitutes a “taking” that requires compensation. 
Under the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence, the only situations in which 
compensation is definitely required are when a regulation destroys the full value of 
ownership77 or involves a permanent physical invasion of property.78   
                                                                                                                                                 
Amendment liability. We simply do not believe the Framers intended the Third Amendment to 
be used to prevent the military from regulated, lawful use of airspace above private property 
without the property owners’ consent. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
75 Though Garvey rested its decision on the disastrous consequences of enforcing a property rule for 
overflights, a simple textual argument would have sufficed. Overflights appear more analogous to an army 
marching across peoples’ land, which is quite different from the army being quartered in their houses, and 
falls under the Takings Clause, if anything. 
76 The literature is too vast to even survey except to note the polar positions. Prof. Treanor argues that the 
original intent behind the clause was limited to actual physical confiscation of property. See William 
Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. 
L. REV. 782, 783 (1995); William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985). On the other side of the 
debate, Prof. Epstein has famously argued that even partial takings must be fully compensated. See 
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 57, at 57-58, 263-273. 
77 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
78 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 422 (1982). 
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 Yet the voluminous literature on regulatory takings has not noticed that the 
Constitution itself explicitly addresses the question.79 The Third Amendment protects 
against quartering of troops, which is a specific type of partial taking. When troops are 
quartered in a private house, the owner’s occupancy of the property is limited and its 
value reduced; yet the owner retains title, can derive some benefit from the property, and 
will presumably regain full possession after some time. In effect, the owner is forced to 
board tenants at rental rate he deems too low – zero dollars. The Supreme Court has 
described similar governmental action as a regulatory taking that does not require 
compensation.80 
 Thus the Constitution isolates and provides protection against one particular form 
of regulatory taking out of the countless forms they can take. This could suggest through 
negative inference (the canon of statutory construction known as expressio unis est 
exclusio alterius) that there is no entitlement against other types of partial takings, even 
those involving physical invasion. Put differently, if the Fifth Amendment protects 
against regulatory takings, then the Third Amendment appears to be unnecessary and 
redundant. A broad application of the negative inference would find that the Third 
                                                 
79 Professor Harrington has briefly adverted to the Third Amendment in a recent discussion of regulatory 
takings. He argues that the Just Compensation Clause and the Third Amendment are related in a different 
way from that suggested here: both were introduced into the Constitution as a means of safeguarding 
citizens against the impositions of a standing army. See Matthew P. Harrington, Regulatory Takings and 
the Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2053, 2073-74 (2004): 
 [T]he traditional fear of large standing armies . . . gave rise to concerns about the power of 
the new national government to requisition supplies without payment. These fears no doubt led 
Madison to include provisions in his proposed amendments prohibiting the quartering of troops 
among the populace. The Compensation Clause added to these protections by preventing the 
government from taking property to support its troops without payment for goods or services 
received.  
This interpretation illustrates the dangers of viewing entitlements in one dimension. See text accompanying 
note 82, infra. 
80 See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156-57 (1921) (Holmes, J.). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Kontorovich                                                                                                     Constitution in Two Dimensions (draft m.s.) 
Page 40 of 74 
Amendment entirely settles the regulatory takings dispute against compensation. A more 
modest reading would find that the Third Amendment provides a benchmark for 
regulatory takings: to be compensable, they would have to involve a much more severe 
deprivation than the quartering of troops. Even this modest interpretation of the Third 
Amendment would be useful to regulatory takings jurisprudence, as the quartering 
benchmark may be easier to implement than Justice Holmes’ notoriously slippery 
standard that regulation only becomes a compensable taking when it goes “too far.”81 
 Yet on closer examination, the Third Amendment does not imply that other types 
of regulatory takings do not require constitutional scrutiny. To understand why, one must 
look at both the Takings Clause and the Peacetime Quartering Clause in two dimensions. 
Both deal with takings, the former with takings generally and the latter with a particular 
type. But there is a fundamental difference between the two, a difference found in the 
remedial rather than in the substantive dimension. The Just Compensation Clause creates 
an entitlement against takings but protects it with a liability rule. The Peacetime 
Quartering clause, by contrast mandates the more robust property rule protection. Thus 
the purpose of the Third Amendment is to ensure greater protection for the anti-
quartering entitlement than for other property rights. The provision of a higher degree of 
protection against what was regarded as a particularly odious type of taking does not 
suggest that there is no substantive entitlement against regulatory takings. To the 
contrary, the Third Amendment’s remedial approach is more consistent with the view 
that there is a substantive entitlement against all other regulatory takings for public use, 
but it is protected by a liability rule. This demonstrates the importance of viewing the 
                                                 
81 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See also, Lucas, 505 U.S. 1015 (“[O]ur decision 
in Mahon offered little insight into when, and under what circumstances, a given regulation would be seen 
as going ‘too far’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
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Constitution in two dimensions. For if one ignored the property rule aspect of the Third 
Amendment, it would lead one to the opposite conclusion -- that regulatory takings do 
not require compensation.82 
 
D. The Third Amendment and the permissibility of liability rules. 
 
 The Third Amendment’s explicit creation of a property rule has great significance 
for the theory of constitutional remedies. It is the only explicit property rule in the 
Constitution. Yet if, as is commonly assumed, all constitutional rights inherently carry 
with them property rule protection, there would be no need for the Third Amendment to 
specify property rule protection. If constitutional rights presumptively cannot be taken 
without consent, the Third Amendment could have simply said “No Soldier shall, in time 
of peace be quartered in any house.” The property rule would be implied from the 
mandatory “shall.” There is a strong presumption against interpreting the Constitution in 
a way that would render some of its language nugatory.83 The phrase “without the 
consent of the Owner” would be pure surplusage if there is a background presumption of 
property rule protection.  
 Every individual entitlement could have been modified with a “consent” 
requirement to protect against its taking. For example, the Fourth Amendment could have 
provided that the right to be free of “unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
                                                 
82 For example, Harrington’s interpretation of the relation between the two provisions illustrates the 
dangers of looking at entitlements in only one dimension. See note 79, supra. He ignores the fundamental 
difference between the two entitlements: the government can take property without consent if it 
subsequently pays for it, but it cannot forcibly “take” the occupancy of a person’s house even if it provides 
compensation. The different remedial treatment of different types of takings suggest that, contrary to 
Harrington’s view, a different set of concerns motivated the two constitutional provisions. 
83 See, e.g. Marbury v. Madison  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.). 
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violated without the consent of the Owner.” But no other entitlement was thus modified.84 
The failure to stipulate consent as a necessary condition for transfers of other 
entitlements, given the explicit provision of this requirement in the Third Amendment, 
suggests that the Constitution does not require property rule protection. 
 This does not mean that all other entitlements must be protected by liability rules. 
The Just Compensation clause mandates a liability rule for the entitlement it protects. 
This too would be superfluous if liability was the default remedy for entitlements whose 
protective rule is not specified. The Third Amendment’s explicit property rule and the 
Just Compensation clause’s explicit liability show that the Constitution’s specification of 
entitlements does not in itself assign either form of protection to entitlements. These two 
explicit remedial provisions delimit the spectrum of constitutional remedies. The 
Constitution only specifies the substance of other entitlements. Its silence about how they 
should be protected is just that: silence. 
 Some have inferred from the Takings Clause that remedies for other rights are left 
to legislative and judicial discretion. But the Third Amendment cements the case: two 
points define a line. Here, the line is the continuum of remedies ranging from injunctive 
relief to money damages, which can be compensatory in various degrees. Both polar 
options – liability and property – are available, as are various “pliability rule” mixtures of 
the two. While property rules will generally be the best mode of protection, this is only 
for functional reasons, and not because of a constitutional requirement.  
                                                 
84 The word “consent” appears in no other amendment, nor in the Art. I, § 9, cl.2-4, which also define 
individual liberties. The word is used in Art. I and elsewhere in relation to structural issues of federalism 
and separation of powers, most famously the requirement of senatorial “Advice and Consent.” Art. II., § 2, 
cl. 2. See e.g., Art I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or 
Duties on Imports and Exports”); Art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (providing inter alia, that “No State shall, without the 
Consent of Congress” engage in military activity or foreign relations). 
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III. STRUCTURAL LIABILITY RULES 
 
 Perhaps the most widespread use of liability rules in constitutional law is also the 
most subtle. “Structural liability rules” do not explicitly call for liability protection, but 
create it in practice by making certain determinations about when the government can, 
without ex ante judicial process, act in a way that might destroy individual entitlements. 
When constitutional law authorizes the government to act first and then justify itself in a 
hearing afterwards, this in effect creates a liability rule in that the initial action cannot be 
enjoined even if it happens to destroy an individual entitlement.  
 
A. Procedural Due Process 
 
 1) The sufficiency of post-deprivation process. 
 The rules governing when a hearing is required under the Due Process Clauses 
sometimes create liability rules. One obstacle to thinking about liability rules as an option 
for constitutional entitlements is that substantive entitlements are often conflated with the 
potential remedies that protect them. The Due Process clause, however, specifically deals 
with the procedures for condemning or transferring the substantive entitlements of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (life, liberty and property). So violations of procedural 
due process are distinct from the underlying violations of liberty or property interests.  
 Determining what “process” is “due” involves choosing between property rules 
and liability rules for the protection of the Fifth Amendment’s substantive rights. When, 
as is generally the case, the “process” must occur before the taking of the substantive 
entitlement, a property rule is created. When the process can be had after the taking, the 
process in effect becomes an ex post remedy and a liability rule is created. The polar 
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cases illustrate the point. At one extreme, the default due process requirement for the 
liberty and property entitlements prohibits their taking without the government first 
condemning them in a trial or similar administrative proceeding.85 Thus the government 
must get ex ante permission -- either from the individual or a court -- to take the 
entitlement. This creates the basic property rule protection for liberty interests. At the 
other extreme, some substantive constitutional rights may be taken with no ex ante 
hearing whatsoever; the victim is confined to “post-deprivation” remedies.86 These lower 
due process requirements create a liability rule since the entitlement can be coercively 
taken at a price established through the ex post process. 
 Between these polar cases are the majority of modern “procedural due process” 
cases involving administrative or “public rights.” In these cases, a property or liberty 
interest created by the government cannot be taken without an ex ante hearing of some 
kind. However, the hearing need not be a full-blown judicial procedure. Rather, it can be 
a down-and-dirty administrative procedure, with resort to judicial process available only 
after the consummation of the challenged action.87 Simplified procedural requirements do 
                                                 
85 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects 
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). See also, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusion About 
Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUMB. L. REV. 309, 330 (1993) (“When 
some kinds of liberty and property interests are involved--the right to freedom from criminal incarceration, 
for example--the Due Process Clause requires a judicial hearing.”). 
86 See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990) (“In some circumstances, however, the Court has held 
that a statutory provision for a postdeprivation hearing, or a common-law tort remedy for erroneous 
deprivation, satisfies due process. . . Parratt and Hudson represent a special case  . . .  in which 
postdeprivation tort remedies are all the process that is due, simply because they are the only remedies the 
State could be expected to provide.”); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (“[W]e hold that an 
unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the 
procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful 
postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.”). 
87 See Fallon, supra note 85, at 330-31 (“[W]hen an adequate substantive justification exists, government 
officials may lawfully deprive people of liberty and property in public rights cases and possibly in other 
circumstances too without first invoking judicial processes.”). 
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not allow for naked takings of entitlements, but they presumably increase the chances that 
the government can deprive individuals of their rights the high level of ex ante scrutiny of 
the transaction allowed by a property rule. Thus they leave the entitlement protected by 
something between a property and a liability rule.   
 The liability rule aspect of confining entitlement holders to post-deprivation 
remedies becomes evident when one considers the classic cases Parratt v. Taylor88 and 
Hudson v. Palmer. These cases involved, respectively, a negligent and intentional (but 
not pursuant to policy) destruction of prisoners’ property by prison officials. Since these 
takings of property were not for public use, they would typically be protected by a 
property rule: the destruction would require the ex ante consent of the prisoner himself, 
or of a judicial officer after an ex ante hearing. However, in these cases, the Court has 
held that a prisoner’s due process right is not violated if his property is accidentally or 
even intentionally destroyed by a prison official, provided that post-deprivation remedies 
are available. In other words, the government can take the entitlement first and pay later.  
 2) Transaction cost justification.  
 High ex ante transaction costs provide the most obvious justification for these 
decisions and thus also suggest their natural limits. Just as allowing drivers to enjoin 
potentially negligent or even reckless motorists would paralyze the highway system, 
allowing prisoners to enjoin negligent prison officials whose actions might destroy their 
property would risk paralyzing the prison system.89 And under certain assumptions about 
the difficulty of monitoring the unauthorized intentional acts of prison employees, the 
                                                 
88 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
89 See id.  
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Kontorovich                                                                                                     Constitution in Two Dimensions (draft m.s.) 
Page 46 of 74 
same is true of intentional destruction of property.90 Thus for procedural due process 
entitlements, ex ante procedures are not required when they would be extraordinarily 
burdensome in comparison to the benefits of the taking.91 When ex ante processes are so 
costly that they would preclude activities with a net social benefit, the government can 
take first and pay money later.92 Indeed, the factors specifically mentioned by the Court 
as militating for liability protection are transaction costs: the administrative expenses of 
allowing property protection and the need for quick action,93 the latter a motif that recurs 
frequently when constitutional rights receive less than property rule protection.94  
                                                 
90 The Supreme Court made these assumptions in Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530-31. 
91 See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (“We tolerate some 
exceptions to the general rule requiring predeprivation notice and hearing, but only in extraordinary 
situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after 
the event.”); Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132 (holding that purely “postdeprivation remedies might satisfy due 
process” when “a predeprivation hearing is unduly burdensome in proportion to the liberty interest at 
stake”). This formulation seems to ignore the social benefit of the government action. The Matthews v. 
Eldridge balancing test does take into account the social benefit from the taking of liberty, under the prong 
focused on “the government’s interest.” See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
92 Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (“This Court has recognized, on many occasions, that where 
. .  it would be impractical to provide predeprivation process, postdeprivation process satisfies the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause.”) (emphasis added); Parratt, 451 U.S. 527; Mathews, 432 U.S. at 
335 (holding that ex ante remedy not required when its marginal benefit over ex post remedy exceeds 
marginal cost). 
93 See Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 930 (noting that providing only postdeprivation process is appropriate “where a 
State must act quickly”) (emphasis added). Compare James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 56-58 
(holding that ex parte civil forfeiture of home violates right to due process because as real property cannot 
abscond, the forfeiture was not “justified by a pressing need for prompt action”), with Calero-Toledo v. 
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679-80 (1974) (holding that “postponement of notice and 
hearing until after seizure did not deny due process” when “the property seized--as here, a yacht . . .  could 
be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were 
given.”). 
94 See text accompanying note 71, supra (discussing need for quick action as a transaction cost basis for 
liability rule for wartime quartering under Third Amendment). 
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 3) Liberty entitlements. 
 Zinermon v. Burch refused to categorically exempt liberty entitlements from 
structural liability rule treatment.95 The transaction cost considerations posed by property 
and liberty interests are different in degree, not in kind, and thus even the latter will 
sometimes be suitable for liability protection.96 However, the Court appeared to 
incorrectly suggest that the difference between property and liberty interests is that the 
latter are generally worth more.97 While this is true of the particular example offered by 
the Court, there is no reason to believe it will always be the case. A deprivation of all of 
one’s property will be more injurious than a one-minute deprivation of liberty, and there 
is no reason to believe that unauthorized deprivations of liberty will be systematically 
more acute than similar deprivations of property. 
 In holding that purely postdeprivation remedies could be appropriate for liberty 
interests as well as property interests, the Court failed to advert to the greater difficulty of 
arriving at a fully compensatory liability for the former.98 Parratt involved the loss of a 
mail-order hobby kit with a determinate monetary value.99 The Court in that case 
observed that protecting the property interest with liability rules was unproblematic 
because the ex post “remedies could have fully compensated . . . for the property loss he 
                                                 
95 See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 131-32 (“Burch argues that postdeprivation tort remedies are never 
constitutionally adequate for a deprivation of liberty, as opposed to property, so the Parratt rule cannot 
apply to this case. We, however, do not find support in precedent for a categorical distinction between a 
deprivation of liberty and one of property.”). 
96 Part I.C, supra, discusses the particular valuation problems raised by liberty entitlements. 
97 Id. at 132 (“It is also true that Burch’s interest in avoiding five months' confinement is of an order 
different from inmate Parratt’s interest in mail-order materials valued at $23.50.”). 
98 See 468 U.S. at 535. 
99 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 529 (noting that lost hobby kit was worth $23.50). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Kontorovich                                                                                                     Constitution in Two Dimensions (draft m.s.) 
Page 48 of 74 
suffered.”100 Yet instead of explicitly considering these ex post transaction costs, 
Zinermon raised the ex ante transaction cost goal post. In cases involving property 
interests, the Court sometimes upholds purely postdeprivation process (a liability rule) 
even when predeprivation process is feasible but “impractical.”101 Yet in Zinermon, the 
Court said predeprivation procedures could only be avoided if requiring them would be 
“impossible” or “absurd.”102 In other words, the inquiry with property interests is whether 
ex ante transaction costs are likely to be higher than the social benefits from the 
transaction; with liberty, the question becomes whether property rules would certainly 
block the social benefit. The higher ex ante transaction cost threshold for liberty liability 
rules can be understood as a veiled response to the ex post valuation problem (though it is 
far from clear that this is what the Court had in mind). Because ex post transaction costs 
are particularly high, ex ante costs must be higher than the level at which liability 
protection of property interests would be proper. 
 
B. Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure. 
 
 1) A de facto liability rule. 
 The Fourth Amendment creates a substantive individual entitlement “against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”103 There are two major competing views about how 
this entitlement must be protected. One theory, focused on warrants, results in something 
                                                 
100 Id. at 544. 
101 Mackey, 443 U.S. at 18-19 (holding that purely postdeprivation process for suspension of drivers license 
not unconstitutional despite argument that state could provide presuspension hearing). 
102 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 136-37 (holding that property rule must govern institutionalization of mentally ill 
because it is not “impossible” to implement). See also, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 342 (1986) 
(Stevens, concurring) (describing Parratt rule as applying to cases where use of property rules is 
“definitionally impossible”). 
103 U.S. CONST., amend. IV.  
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art1
Kontorovich                                                                                                     Constitution in Two Dimensions (draft m.s.) 
Page 49 of 74 
close to property rule protection. The other, focused solely on the substantive 
reasonableness of the search, leans towards a liability rule. The liability rule seems to be 
more sensitive to the underlying transaction costs.   
 The Supreme Court has said that the Fourth Amendment requires warrants for all 
to searches or seizures.104 Prof. Amar has powerfully criticized this view, arguing that 
reasonableness is the sole criterion for permissible searches. A search pursuant to a 
warrant is presumptively reasonable, but an unwarranted search could also be reasonable. 
If the Fourth Amendment requires warrants, then it creates something close to property 
rule protection. A warrant requirement would protect against searches unless the 
individual entitlement-holder consents,105 or the government condemns the entitlement by 
securing the ex ante approval of a judge. Because warrant hearings are conducted ex 
parte and the government need not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the Fourth 
Amendment property rule is less robust than the property protection for the liberty of 
criminal defendants.106 But the emphasis on ex ante approval, and the presumptive 
invalidity of a search that proceeds without such approval, makes the warrant 
requirement more a property rule than anything else. Furthermore, government officials 
are protected against subsequent tort suits when they act armed with a warrant. Thus the 
warrant clearly preempts liability rule protection. 
 The other view of the Fourth Amendment is that warrants are never required. The 
government can search when reasonable. If government officials acting without a warrant 
                                                 
104 See AMAR, supra note 3. 
105 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242-43 (1973) (“While the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments limit the circumstances under which the police can conduct a search, there is nothing 
constitutionally suspect in a person’s voluntarily allowing a search.”).  
106 See text accompanying notes 28-30, supra.  
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act unreasonably and violate the Fourth Amendment rights, they must subsequently 
answer in damages. Thus without a warrant requirement, the government can search first 
and pay later, subject to the limitations of sovereign immunity. The nature of most 
searches and seizures is such that they cannot in practice be prospectively enjoined: they 
simply happen too fast, and often without warning. Injunctive relief will be elusive. Yet 
unwarranted searches can easily violate individual entitlements.  
 If the Fourth Amendment only requires that the search be reasonable, an issue that 
will only be litigated after the search, then it creates something that in practice works like 
a liability rule. To be sure, Fourth Amendment rights are nominally protected by property 
rules, because injunctive relief is theoretically available against illegal searches.107 This is 
why the reasonableness-based Fourth Amendment is best understood as a structural 
liability rule. Because of the nature of the actions against which the entitlement protects, 
any rule that does not require ex ante process for conduct that may threaten the 
entitlement effectively pushes the protection closer to a liability rule. The liability rule is 
well-justified by transaction costs. It would, for example, be prohibitively expensive for 
police to seek a warrant before making a search incident to arrest. The costs of delay 
alone in such situations would exceed the social gains from searching. 
 2) Between the Third and Fifth Amendments: a possible de jure liability rule. 
 This raises the question of whether it makes sense to have even nominal property 
rule protection of Fourth Amendment rights – that is, whether injunctions should be 
                                                 
107 The Fourth Amendment say the entitlements “shall not be violated,” which has lead many commentators 
to conclude that it must be protected with property rules. See AMAR, supra note 3, at 43. This conflates a 
remedy with a right. The substantive entitlement is clear, but because it is silent on the question of 
remedies, it is less clear whether an unreasonable search followed by a payment of just compensation can 
be considered a “violation” rather than a compensable taking of the entitlement. Because the right does not 
specify a mode for its protection, liability rule protection may not violate the right. 
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available in the rare cases where they can be obtained before the entitlement is taken.108 
This will generally be in situations where a particular search policy or system is in place, 
rather than situations involving isolated or spontaneous searches. By looking at how 
transaction costs are dealt with in the Third Amendment and the Takings Clause – the  
provisions that explicitly choose between liability and property – might be a useful way 
of inferring the appropriate treatment of intermediate entitlements that leave remedies 
unspecified, like the Fourth Amendment. 
 Recall that the Third Amendment protects the anti-quartering entitlement with a 
property rule in peacetime, while the Fifth Amendment protects the property entitlement 
with a liability rule. What is striking is that the substantive entitlements are very similar 
in kind: they both protect against invasions and uses of one’s real property by the 
government. Moreover, both entitlements are akin to the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
of “homes” and “effects” – all of these amendments have been described as creating 
“constitutional property.” Recall also the two main variables in choosing between 
liability and property rules: ex ante transaction costs, and ex post transaction costs, of 
which valuation difficulties are a significant component. 
 Some of the interests protected by the Third Amendment, such as the sentimental 
value of living in one’s home, are difficult to accurately monetize. However, this cannot 
explain why the Third Amendment protects them with a property rule, because all of the 
same idiosyncratic valuations are implicated in eminent domain, where a liability rule is 
                                                 
108 Even Amar, famous for his endorsement of the tort model for enforcing Fourth Amendment rights, 
believes in the necessity of injunctive relief when possible. He does argue that ex post civil damages, rather 
than the exclusionary rule, should be the remedy for illegal searches when it is too late for an injunction. 
This is not about replacing the nominal property rule protection with a liability rule, but rather about the 
proper measure of ex post compensation when injunctions fail. Amar argues that exclusion is a bad measure 
of damages because it is always either undercompensatory (for the innocent) and overcompensatory (for 
the guilty). See id. 
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used. If it is hard to put a price on the inconvenience and sentimental loss from strangers 
in military helmets living in one’s home, it is at least equally difficult to put a price on the 
inconvenience and sentimental loss from strangers in hard hats knocking down that 
home. The same applies to the Fourth Amendment – to strangers in police caps 
rummaging around one’s home. Thus ex post transaction costs do not appear that 
different from the Third to the Fourth to the Fifth Amendment. The provision of a 
liability rule in the latter context suggests that the Constitution does not treat such injuries 
as posing insurmountable valuation difficulties. 
 Thus the Third Amendment’s peacetime property rule is solely a function of very 
low front-end transaction costs; or conversely, the Fifth Amendment’s liability rule is a 
response to particularly high ex ante transaction costs. In either case, it is not ex post 
valuation difficulties doing the work. Fourth Amendment anti-search rights, at least as 
applied to property, are similar in nature to those protected by the Third and Fifth 
Amendment and thus present similar valuation problems. The explicit remedial choices 
made by the Third and Fifth Amendments suggest liability rules for searches of real 
“houses” and “effects” would be proper when transaction costs are particularly high; and 
perhaps unconstitutional when, as in the peacetime Third Amendment, transaction costs 
are close to zero. Moreover, the Fifth Amendment’s focus on eminent domain suggests 
that perhaps only certain types of transaction costs will justify liability rule protection – 
particularly, holdout problems. This view is confirmed by the Third Amendment’s shift 
to a liability rule in wartime, when holdout problems are likely to arise. 
 The Fourth Amendment does not mandate liability rule protection, and it may be 
advisable to reserve it for exceptional situations with a transaction cost structure 
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analogous to eminent domain. Consider the following hypothetical. The police know that 
an escaped felon is hiding in the house of a friend in a particular city block, yet they have 
no information as to which house it is. Assume also that searching every house would be 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Every home owner could thus frustrate the 
entire search effort. The problem is one of adverse selection. While innocent homeowners 
would freely consent to a search, the government could not obtain the consent of those 
owners with something to hide, such as the owner sheltering the felon. At the very least, 
non-innocent owners would only agree to a search if paid compensation far above 
whatever a “market” rate would be for the search entitlement. In this situation, a socially 
optimal rule would allow the police to search and then pay a judicially-determined “fair” 
amount. To put it differently, liability rules can be reserved for situations where a search 
would be reasonable on a collective but not on an individual basis.109 
 3) Liberty entitlements. 
 The discussion thus far has been confined to searches of things, rather than 
searches or seizures of people. The latter involve liberty interests quite different from the 
property interests protected by the Third and Fifth Amendments. Courts face greater 
difficulties in accurately valuing liberty than property.110 Thus it would take 
extraordinary ex ante transaction costs to justify a liability approach to liberty 
entitlements. To refer again to the Fifth Amendment, both liberty and property are 
protected against deprivation without due process; but the Takings Clause only mandates 
liability rules for property. This suggests that for remedial purposes, what will be true of 
searches of things under the Fourth Amendment will not necessarily be true of searches 
                                                 
109 See Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 796-97. 
110 Part I.C, supra, discusses the particular valuation problems raised by liberty entitlements. 
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and seizures of persons. This distinction is made in current Fourth Amendment doctrine, 
which requires greater cause to justify a search or arrest of a person than a search or 
seizure of things. This difference in the scope of substantive anti-search entitlements may 
be a response to the greater difficulty involved in valuing liberty interests. But it is an 
awkward response, because it attempts to deal with remedial difficulties by adjusting the 
scope of the substantive anti-search right. This is again a result of constitutional law’s 
ignoring the second dimension of entitlements. A system that reflects the same 
constitutional values but works in both dimensions would establish the same substantive 
standard of reasonableness regardless of the object of the seizure, but would protect 
persons with property rules and things with liability rules.    
 
IV. LIABILITY RULES FOR GOVERNMENTAL ENTITLEMENTS 
 
 Thus far, this Article has dealt with liability rules for individual rights. However, 
constitutional law creates governmental “entitlements” as well.111 These are the powers 
the government has to regulate individuals, either under the amorphous “police power” or 
pursuant to an explicit constitutional grant of authority, such as the Taxing power. As 
with individual rights, the government’s entitlements are almost always protected by 
property rules: individuals cannot appropriate these powers from the government without 
the its consent. Some governmental powers are protected by inalienability rules: the 
government cannot sell or grant them.112 It is unconventional to think about governmental 
                                                 
111 See Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism of Means, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 311-12 (1999) (“[C]riminal prohibitions, which are intended to protect the public as 
a whole, give rise to a societal right--the right to the non-breach thereof.  . . ‘entitlements’ here are not 
necessarily the rights of individuals, as is typically the case with constitutional rights; they frequently 
belong to the state or to society at large.”). 
112 The non-delegation doctrine can be understood as an inalienability rule for governmental entitlements. 
On the other hand, very few individuals rights are protected by inalienability rules. The Thirteenth 
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entitlements as being protected by liability rules113: constitutional rights are usually 
thought of as rights against the government.114 However, in the First Amendment 
doctrine of prior restraint and the setting of bail under the Eighth Amendment, the 
government’s regulatory entitlements are protected by liability rather than property rules. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Amendment’s ban on slavery is one of the few obvious inalienability rules for individual rights, as is the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 
113 For example, one of the only scholars to consider the possibilities of constitutional liability rules writes 
that “although it may be possible to imagine” that “an individual can acquire a constitutional right against 
the government by paying the government for the costs associated with its exercise,” he concludes “such 
rules, if any actually exist… are rare.” Merrill, supra note 2, at 1153 (emphasis added). Merrill suggests 
one possible example: a rule that permits groups to hold demonstrations in public streets providing they pay 
for the increased costs of providing police protection and litter removal, such as the one invalidated in 
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).  See Merrill, supra note 2, at 1153 n.32. He 
recognizes that such an arrangement may be impermissible under current constitutional doctrine. What is 
more important for the present discussion is that this arrangement does not represent a “Rule Four” liability 
rule. A Rule Four policy would allow the protesters to have their demonstration without any prior approval 
or negotiation with the government; only after the demonstration could the government seek to charge the 
group for the costs they created, and a court could ultimately determine the appropriate level of 
compensation. In the system in question in Nationalist Movement, the county administrator determined the 
amount of the fee, and payment in advance was necessary to secure a permit. See Nationalist Movement, 
502 U.S. at 126-27. Even if the administrator’s calculations are based on the anticipated costs, this system 
represents a Rule Three property rule protection of the government’s entitlement to make time, place and 
manner restrictions on demonstrations. The price of the entitlement is set by the government, and thus it 
represents its valuation, not an independent judicial valuation. Moreover, the government can presumably 
enjoin demonstrations that fail to secure the permit in advance, even if the demonstrators did not do so 
because they considered the fee extortionate. (And of course, violation of such an injunction would be 
subject to the collateral bar rule, under which a subsequent finding of unconstitutionality against the permit 
system or the particular price assessed would not be a defense to a contempt prosecution for violating the 
injunction.). The would-be demonstrators in Nationalist Movement apparently realized that the permit 
scheme was protected by property rule, because they did not demonstrate without a permit, which under 
Rule Four they could have done without fear of contempt. Instead, they abandoned their demonstration and 
challenged the permit scheme in court. Id. at 127. 
114 See Merrill, supra note 2, at 1152 (arguing that considering full range of entitlement/remedy 
combinations introduced in The Cathedral “makes no sense in considering constitutional entitlements, 
where the authoritative constitutional text itself establishes the menu of entitlements and who gets them – 
generally private persons who are subject to government regulatory power. . . Thus an analysis that 
downplays the question of who gets the entitlement makes more sense here.”). It bears noting that one of 
the two liability rules discussed in this Part, the prior restraint doctrine, is not established by “the 
authoritative constitutional text” but rather by judicial decision. It also happens to be the one constitutional 
liability rule discussed in this Article that is not justified by transaction costs. See text accompanying notes 
129-141, supra.  
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A. The Constitution’s “Rule Four.” 
  
 These liability rules for social entitlements correspond to Calabresi and 
Melamed’s “Rule Four” entitlement-remedy combination. The best way to explain Rule 
Four is with Calabresi and Melamed’s pollution example.115 Under basic tort principles, 
which Calabresi and Melamed classify as “Rule One,” the substantive entitlement related 
pollution is assigned to those harmed by the pollution (the pollutees). The pollutees’ 
substantive entitlement to be free of pollution is protected by a property rule: the 
pollution can be enjoined as a nuisance. However, Calabresi and Melamed suggest 
another possible arrangement which they call “Rule Four.” The entitlement is originally 
assigned to the polluter, but only protected by a liability rule. The pollutees can “buy out” 
the polluter’s right to continue his harmful activities, even without his consent, but only 
by paying him judicially-determined compensation. Thus Rule Four is a private right of 
eminent domain over the polluting activities. This is useful in the rare situations where 
there is uncertainty as to whether the social costs of pollution exceeds the benefits of the 
pollution-causing activity, and the pollutees may be best situated to reduce the costs.116   
 Rule Four is almost never used in private law, and Calabresi and Melamed 
conceded that “it does not often lend itself to judicial imposition for a number of good 
legal process reasons.”117 It is equally rare in constitutional law, which has led an 
observer to posit its irrelevance in this context.118 In private law, Rule Four is difficult to 
                                                 
115 See Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 1, at 1116-17. See also, Spur Industries, Inc. v. 
Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972). 
116 See Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 1, at 1120-21. 
117 Id. at 1116. 
118 See Merrill, supra note 2, at 1152-53 (arguing that Rule Four is an “unnecessary appendage in the 
constitutional realm”). 
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administer because it requires apportioning the costs of taking the polluter’s entitlement 
across many pollutees, each of whom may have been harmed to a different extent.119 
However, in constitutional law, Rule Four is used when it is an individual who might take 
the government’s substantive entitlement under the liability rule. The full cost of the 
entitlement in is paid for by the individual, so there is no apportionment problem.  
B. Prior restraint.  
1) The doctrine. 
 
 The First Amendment doctrine of prior restraint regards prospective restrictions 
on speech as presumptively invalid.120 Not all speech enjoys First Amendment protection 
– speakers can be punished for, among other things, obscenity, libel, and incitement. But 
under the rule against prior restraint, the government can only impose sanctions for 
unprotected speech after it has occurred.121 The doctrine, like the First Amendment itself, 
was originally intended to guard against newspaper licensing schemes and other methods 
of administrative censorship. Under 18th century licensing requirements, newspaper 
publishers had to obtain permission in advance from the government to print anything. 
However, the doctrine has since expanded to preclude courts from enjoining potentially 
unprotected speech, even in private defamation suits.122 Commentators have been critical 
of the doctrine because judicially-imposed prior restraints do not share many of the 
                                                 
119 See Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 1, at 1116-17.  
120 See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (per curiam) (“Any system of prior restraints of expression comes 
to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”) (quoting Bantam Books v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). 
121 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 721 (1931) (“The freedom of the press from previous restraint has 
never been regarded as limited to such animadversions as lay outside the range of penal enactments . . .as 
the privilege so limited would be of slight value for the purposes for which it came to be established.”); 
Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 684 (1955) 
(“[R]estrictions which could be validly imposed when enforced by subsequent punishment are . . . 
forbidden if attempted by prior restraint.”). 
122 See Near, 283 U.S. at 721-23. 
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undesirable characteristics of licensing schemes.123 However, despite these objections124 
the Supreme Court has continued to adhere to the broad prior restrain doctrine.125 
 Because it is hard to see any reason to be more solicitous of unprotected speech 
when it is embryonic than when it is fully hatched, the justification for the doctrine must 
lie primarily in its “chilling effect” on protected speech. Prior restraints may for various 
reasons cut too wide a swath, stifling protected speech along with unprotected speech.126 
Thus prior restraint is like overbreadth and vagueness – it saves unprotected speech (at 
least temporarily) so that protected speech may go free. As Justice Frankfurter has 
pointed out, this justification for the prior restraint doctrine is only somewhat coherent: 
any ex post criminal regulation of unprotected speech acts as a prior restraint by deterring 
lawful speakers who fear they may step over the line and face punishment.127 
 2) Transaction costs justification. 
 The prior restraint doctrine creates a liability rule by banning injunctions against 
harmful speech but allowing those injured by the speech to seek monetary damages after 
the fact.128 Prior restraint applies to unprotected types of speech – speech that individuals 
                                                 
123 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment 
Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 90 (1984) (“In most instances, judicially issued prior restraints on expression 
are no more harmful to first amendment interests than are subsequent punishment systems and therefore do 
not deserve the traditional disdain imposed by the prior restraint doctrine.”).   
124 See id.; John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983); William T. 
Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, 
and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1982). 
125 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (observing, anachronistically, that “court orders 
that actually forbid speech activities [] are classic examples of prior restraints.”). 
126 See Jeffries, supra note 124, at 425; 428-29 (criticizing the overbreadth and chilling effect rationales for 
prior restraint). 
127 Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). See also, Randy Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 
29 STAN. L. REV. 539 (1977). 
128 A few scholars have recognized this point. See Bendor, supra note 111, at 312-13 (“The constitutional 
bias against prior restraints results in the use of liability rules to protect civil law anti-speech entitlements. . 
. [A] party interested in impairing an anti-speech entitlement has the power to do so, but in return he or she 
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do not have a constitutional entitlement to make. Thus the liability rule protects society’s 
entitlement to be free of certain types of speech, or to put it differently the government’s 
right to regulate certain types of speech for the benefit of society.129 Under the prior 
restrain doctrine, this anti-speech entitlement cannot be protected through injunctions, 
even in advance of an imminent harm. Rather, the speaker can forcibly “take” the anti-
speech entitlement and then pay satisfaction to the injured individual or the public, either 
through civil damages or jail time.130 
 What must now be considered is whether this somewhat unusual arrangement 
reflects the underlying transaction costs. It will be useful to put anti-speech entitlements 
into one of two categories, each typified by a landmark prior restraint case: individual 
entitlements such as the right to be free from defamation (Near) and collective ones such 
as the right to be free from speech that undermines national security (Pentagon Papers). 
Liability rules become increasingly attractive as ex ante transaction costs increase, and as 
the difficulty of valuing the entitlement decreases. When the anti-speech entitlement is 
individual, there are relatively few barriers to efficient bargaining between a prospective 
taker of the entitlement (the libeler or slanderer) and the person whose reputation would 
be harmed. The entitlement holders are few, their identities known in advance, and they 
                                                                                                                                                 
must pay the holder of the entitlement compensation at a rate determined by the state.”); Roberta Rosenthal 
Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 
47, 64 (1994) (“Integral to the resolution of the conflict between the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment is the recognition that certain situations will be most effectively resolved by a liability rule 
approach in which a successful right-of-publicity plaintiff is awarded damages rather than injunctive relief. 
This approach is consistent with constitutional doctrine which holds that prior restraints of speech are 
particularly offensive to First Amendment values.”). 
129 See Bendor, supra note 111, at 312-13 (“[I]ndividuals, society, and the state have certain ‘anti-speech’ 
entitlements, or entitlements that require limitation of the speech rights of others.”). 
130 See id. (“Without the doctrine of prior restraint, the holder of the [anti-speech] entitlement could refuse 
to sell it, or at the very least, could hold out for the price that he or she deemed satisfactory… Instead, the 
victim of a libel is entitled to compensation from the person harming him or her at a rate that is determined 
by the court.”). 
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can be negotiated with directly. Thus if the prospective speaker fails to secure the consent 
of the entitlement-holder in advance, it implies that the latter places a higher value on the 
speech than does the former. A forcible transfer of the entitlement would be inefficient. 
So in Near-type cases, transaction costs do not justify the ban on prior restraints.131 
 The transaction cost calculation is different when collective or social entitlements 
are involved. Too many people are harmed by national-security impairing or obscene 
speech for the speaker to be able to identify them in advance, let alone negotiate with 
them for the taking of the entitlement. Furthermore, the members of the large and diffuse 
injured group will face severe coordination and holdout problems.132 Under a property 
rule, these transaction costs would prohibit efficient ex ante deals; they would block 
speech from ever being made even when the speaker is willing to pay the full social cost. 
So at first glance, the prior restraint liability rule makes sense for speech that violates 
communally-held anti-speech entitlements.133 
 Yet this is not fully satisfactory. While “society” is too diffuse to bargain with, it 
has appointed a unitary agent to enforce its anti-speech entitlements – the government. 
After all, the publisher of obscenity or national security-compromising materials 
ultimately pays sanctions to the government, not society. And government – the 
centralization of collective entitlements for bargaining purposes – is a classic solution of 
both holdout and free-rider problems. Thus government enforcements of collective anti-
speech entitlements greatly reduces transaction costs. 
                                                 
131 Id. at 317. 
132 Id. (“The cost of gathering the members of a large group is huge, and sometimes such an operation is 
logistically impossible. Moreover, the completion of the transaction is contingent upon the separate consent 
of each member of the group; each of them is therefore in a position to extort in a manner that will yield her 
profits at the expense of the other parties.”). 
133 Id.  
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 However, the government is not society. It is merely an imperfect agent for 
society.134 The government may not properly internalize costs when taking land under the 
eminent domain liability rule.135 Similarly, it is not clear whether it has proper incentives 
to accept an efficient payment from a prospective speaker in exchange for giving up its 
anti-speech entitlement. Under a property rule the government might sometimes refuse 
reasonable compensation out of self-interested political motives; Pentagon Papers again 
comes to mind.136 Still, it is far from clear that concern about agency problems should 
dictate the choice between liability and property rules in the Free Speech context when 
they do not in the Takings context. The political process is the primary mechanism for 
policing against agency problems in government.137  
 To fully evaluate the prior restraint liability rule, the administrative and error 
costs involved in judicially valuing the entitlement must also be considered.138 The social 
harm caused by disclosure of national secrets or obscenity are diffuse and inchoate, and 
thus hard to measure. Because these entitlements are not traded in markets (and are not 
even analogous to common law torts) courts cannot use market prices to determine 
damages. Thus judicial valuations of the entitlement will be highly error-prone. Another 
problem with the liability rules may involve the magnitude of the harm. The potential 
                                                 
134 See Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 776-7. 
135 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional 
Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 348 (2000) (arguing that government does not fully internalize costs as 
private actors do, and thus requiring government to pay compensation does not affect its conduct as much 
as it would a private actor). 
136 See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 734-24 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The dominant purpose of the First 
Amendment was to prohibit  . . . governmental suppression of embarrassing information. . .  The present 
cases will, I think, go down in history as the most dramatic illustration of that principle.”). 
137 See Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 777.  
138 One commentator maintains that these entitlements are “incommensurable” and thus inappropriate for 
liability rules. See Bendor, supra note 111, at 318-20, 322-23. One need not adopt the metaphysical 
language of incommensurability to come to the same conclusion.  
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speaker may be judgment-proof, unable to pay compensatory damages for some 
collective entitlements. For example, the inciter may not be able to afford the costs of the 
riot, all difficulties of valuation aside. National security prior restraint cases like 
Pentagon Papers and Progressive139 are even clearer examples of cases where if the 
threatened harm transpired, the speaker would not have the resources to pay for it. 
Criminal enforcement becomes an attractive substitute for liability rules in such 
situations, as The Cathedral pointed out.140 
 In sum, the prior restraint doctrine creates a liability rule, but it is not a response 
to heightened transaction costs. In the case of individual anti-speech entitlements, ex ante 
transaction costs are quite low, and the existence of government substantially reduces 
transaction costs for collective anti-speech entitlements. Moreover, the latter type will be 
difficult for courts to value, further weakening the case for liability rules. Valuation 
difficulties aside, the absolute size of the injury may be high enough that most potential 
speakers would be judgment-proof. The potential concern about using a property rule 
would be that the government would for self-interested political reasons withhold consent 
to socially efficient takings of its anti-speech entitlement.  
 3) Flipping the entitlement.   
 While the prior restraint doctrine is not justified by the underlying transaction 
costs, The Cathedral suggests an alternative entitlement/protective rule structure that 
would allow the doctrine’s substantive goals to be realized. The prior restraint doctrine 
                                                 
139 United States v. Progressive, Inc., 486 F.Supp. 5, 9 (W.D. Wisc. 1979) (reaffirming injunction against 
publication of magazine article explaining how to build a hydrogen bomb because it would “likely cause 
direct, immediate and irreparable injury to this nation”); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 
990 (W.D. Wisc. 1979) (granting preliminary injunction despite concluding that it is a First Amendment 
prior restraint). 
140 See Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 1, at 1125 n.69. 
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prevents the government from enjoining publication, but allows it to impose fines 
afterwards. A more efficient way of preventing First Amendment “chilling affects” would 
be to flip the entitlement. The substantive right would be initially allocated to the speaker, 
who could make even non-protected speech. However, the government could forcibly 
condemn this entitlement. In other words, the government could enjoin publication – 
“take” the entitlement -- but would then have to pay judicially-determined damages if a 
court subsequently found the speech to be constitutionally protected.141 
 Pentagon Papers shows the utility of the flipped approach. The Court thought the 
only alternatives were to allow the prior restraint or to allow publication. Given the 
national security stakes involved, this left several justices visibly conflicted and resulted 
in a weak per curiam decision with nine separate opinions, none commanding five votes. 
Now imagine if the entitlement were flipped. The court could have sustained the prior 
restraint, but the Times would be able to subsequently sue for damages, and with the 
urgency of the enjoin-or-allow decision having faded, the merits could be more carefully 
considered. 
 This would also have avoided a chilling affect on protected speech. Newspapers 
are commercial enterprises run for profit, often with publicly-traded shares (although 
published news has public good characteristics and may create positive externalities). 
They respond to financial incentives. The prospect of eventually receiving compensatory 
damages for an injunction against protected speech would ensure that newspapers would 
not be deterred from investigating and publishing such stories in the future. Newspapers 
would have full incentive to pursue stories that fall within the realm of protected speech 
                                                 
141 Professor Merrill has suggested a similar approach in the specific context of tobacco advertising. See 
Merrill, supra note 2, at 1199-1204 (suggesting that government could “condemn the tobacco companies’ 
right to advertise in return for the payment of just compensation”). 
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because they would be compensated for their investment either directly, through 
publication, or indirectly, through damages. Thus the government’s security interests 
would be vindicated without compromising First Amendment values. 
 Another advantage of this approach is that the newspapers’ damages are easier to 
compute than the government’s.142 As has been discussed, it is difficult to accurately 
monetize the value of intangible interest such as national security secrecy and decent 
speech. It is much easier to determine a newspaper’s loss from having a speech 
entitlement condemned. One might look at the projected increase in sales from running a 
scoop, how much additional advertising revenue it would generate, in addition to 
publicity value for the paper. Such things could be measured by looking at past 
experience with similarly sensational stories.143 
 Furthermore, while anti-speech entitlements like national security secrecy and 
obscenity may be hard to value, the government will probably possess better information 
about the scope of the potential harm than would the would-be speaker.144 Under the 
prior restraint doctrine, imperfect information may make it hard for a speaker to know 
whether to publish or not, because of uncertainty about the size of ex post sanctions. This 
uncertainty may itself chill speech. Yet if the government were the one taking a speech 
                                                 
142 See generally, Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 1, at 1120-21 (noting that whether the 
polluter or pollute should be protected by liability rule depends in part whose entitlement is easier to value 
through the judicial process). 
143 Prof. Merrill has argued that it would be possible to establish market values for commercial speech, that 
is, advertising: “The ability to put a monetary value on commercial speech rights reminds us that 
commercial advertising has always had a dual nature: part commerce and part speech, or really both at once 
. . . The commerce side of commercial speech renders it, unlike many other constitutional rights, subject to 
government condemnation.” See Merrill, supra note 2, at 1202-03. From the perspective of incentives, this 
point goes beyond the First Amendment category of commercial speech to any speech made for business 
purposes. 
144 See generally, Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 1, at 1119-20 (discussing relevance of 
asymmetrical transaction costs to allocation of entitlement and choice of protective rule). 
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entitlement under a liability rule, it could use its superior (but often classified) knowledge 
about the size of the social injury. This would make it more likely that the entitlement 
would be transferred when, and only when, it is socially efficient.145   
 A major drawback of the flipped entitlement approach would be the creation 
moral hazard. If newspapers were entitled to payment for suppressed unprotected speech, 
they might devote more resources to digging up national security secrets and obscene 
matter. They could prepare an edition full of incitement to violence and have the 
government “buy it out.” This problem stems from the odd feature of prior restraint law – 
that it applies to unprotected as well as protected speech. Flipping the entitlement simply 
relocates the perverse consequences. Under a flipped liability rule, the government 
should only have to pay for condemnation of protected speech; otherwise the moral 
hazard problems would be insurmountable. If the speech turns out to be unprotected, the 
government would be free to pursue civil and criminal sanctions against the speaker, 
thereby reducing moral hazard.  
 The moral hazard problem suggests the flipped entitlement approach should not 
be used in all contexts. But it could be appropriate for borderline cases where it is 
difficult to determine, especially in the hurry of an equitable proceeding, whether speech 
enjoys First Amendment protection. For example, in Pentagon Papers several justices 
admitted that the matter ripened too quickly for them to be able to get a good grip on the 
                                                 
145  
If the courts are very uncertain about the correct analysis of external costs and benefits, a 
liability rule provides a mechanism for assuring that the correct conclusion has been drawn. 
Under a liability rule, the government must compensate the rightsholder for the private value of 
exercising the constitutional right. Insofar as the government seeks to obtain the maximum 
benefit from its expenditure of public funds, the government will condemn and compensate only 
if the social benefits of extinguishing the right exceed the private value of the right.  
See Merrill, supra note 2, at 1201. 
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merits.146 The justices were divided on whether the speech fell within the First 
Amendment’s substantive protection. When it is unclear whether an individual has a 
substantive speech entitlement (protected by a property rule) or the government has the 
corresponding anti-speech entitlement (protected by a liability rule), the best compromise 
may be to presume that the individual has the entitlement but to only protect it with a 
liability rule. By extension, the flipped-entitlement approach could be useful for 
borderline categories of speech, where doctrine is in flux and the scope or existence of 
substantive protection is uncertain.147 
 
C. Bail.  
 
 1) The liability rule. 
 The Eighth Amendment provides that “Excessive bail shall not be required.”148 
This establishes a liability rule for the government’s entitlement to detain people between 
arrest and conviction. The government is allowed to hold defendants pending trial. The 
defendants, however, can buy out the government’s detention right without its consent. 
To see the liability rule clearly, imagine if the government’s entitlement were protected 
by a property rule. A defendant would have to negotiate directly with the U.S. Attorney 
                                                 
146 See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 725 (Brennan, concurring) (noting the “the necessary haste with 
which decisions were reached” and “the magnitude of the interests asserted”); id. at 748 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (“These cases are not simple for another and more immediate reason. We do not know the facts 
of the cases.  . . I suggest we are in this posture because these cases have been conducted in unseemly haste. 
. . It seems reasonably clear now that the haste precluded reasonable and deliberate judicial treatment of 
these cases.”). 
147 See id. at 1202 (“Liability rules [for speech entitlements]. . .may be particularly appropriate where there 
is a high level of uncertainty about whether a police power rule should apply [that is, whether the speech 
should be protected in the first place].”)  
148 U.S. CONST., amend VIII. 
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for a “bail bargain,” much as they now negotiate for “plea bargains.”149 The amount of 
bail would be determined, if at all, by agreement. However, the Eighth Amendment 
generally allows suspects to bypass such negotiations, and to obtain their liberty pending 
trial by paying a judicially-determined amount. Thus the  prohibition on “excessive bail” 
is the counterpart of the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of “just compensation”: the 
judge ensures the price of the entitlement is close to its “market” value. 
 Of course, the way bail is popularly conceptualized is that the government does 
not have a “right” to detain people pending trial because the Constitution gives people a 
“right” to bail. This is a doctrinal error; individuals can be denied bail.150 But the error 
stems largely from confusing rights with remedies. The government’s pre-trial detention 
right is not recognized as an entitlement precisely because the liability rule makes 
transfers relatively easy and thus the entitlement rarely stays in its default position. (In 
the unusual situations where bail is not available, as can happen for capital offenses, the 
government’s entitlement is protected with a property rule.151) Nor does the government 
have a entitlement to detain people only when they pose a flight risk or other danger to 
                                                 
149 The Supreme Court has left it unclear whether the Bail Clause applies to the states through the 
incorporation doctrine. See Nelson Lund, The Past And Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. 
REV. 1, 49 n.112 (1996) (“Since the process of incorporation began, the Court has apparently not had an 
occasion to decide whether the Excessive Fines and Excessive Bail Clauses of the Eighth Amendment or 
the Third Amendment should be applied against the states.”). 
150 The Excessive Bail clause only governs the amount of bail in those cases where bail is required, but 
does not require bail in all cases. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987) (“This Clause, of 
course, says nothing about whether bail shall be available at all.”); Carlson v. Landon  342 U.S. 524, 545-
546 (1952) (“The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in 
which bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus in criminal cases bail is not compulsory where the 
punishment may be death.”); United States v. Abrahams  575 F.2d 3, 5 (1st Cir. 1978) (“The eighth 
amendment proscribes excessive bail, but it does not mandate that a defendant be allowed bail in all 
cases.”). See also, Sellers v. United States, 89 S.Ct. 36, 38 (1968) (Black, J., in chambers) (“The command 
of the Eighth Amendment . .  . obligates judges passing upon the right to bail to deny such relief only for 
the strongest of reasons.”). For example, capital offenses are traditionally nonbailable. See Salerno, 481 
U.S. at 753 (“A court may . . . refuse bail in capital cases.”).  
151 Presumably judges would not deny bail if the prosecution thinks some high level of bail is appropriate. 
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society. It has an entitlement to detain under all circumstances, and things like risk of risk 
just affect the price at which the individual can force a taking against the government. 
Consider the case of someone who poses no flight risk, and so his bail is set at one dollar. 
The suspect remains in jail unless he affirmatively chooses to post the bail.152 This 
demonstrates that the broad detention entitlement is initially assigned to the government.  
 2) Transaction cost justification.  
 The Bail Clause’s liability rule can be understood as a response to monopoly 
power on the government’s side. It is not clear that monopoly power would block socially 
efficient transactions (bail releases), but it would affect how any surplus is distributed 
between the government and bailees.153 Thus the purpose of the Eighth Amendment’s 
bail provision could be merely distributional.  
 When an entitlement belongs to the government, as in the bail context, many 
individual defendants must deal with a single, unified entitlement-holder. The presence of 
a monopolist on one side of the transaction does not mean that a socially efficient bargain 
can’t be reached. It is in the monopolist’s interest to make a deal. His monopoly power 
will simply lead him to charge an supercompetitive price and thus expropriate most of the 
social surplus. Typically a monopolist reduces output to increase prices, and in such cases 
monopoly has both distributional and efficiency affects because supply is suboptimally 
                                                 
152 See, e.g. Tatum v. Morton, 386 F. Supp. 1308, 1310 (D.D.C. 1974) (arrestees held overnight in jail when 
they refused to post $10 bond because they said they “would not participate in the bail system which 
discriminated against persons without sufficient money to ‘buy’ their release”). In Tatum, the Court ruled 
that the arrestee’s refusal to post such a “trifling” bond represented a failure to mitigate damages arising 
from an unlawful detention, especially given that it would not have “compelled plaintiffs to compromise or 
sacrifice any rights.” Thus plaintiffs could not recover damages for prolongation of detention past the point 
at which they could have posted the bond. Id. at 1312. 
153 For a model of optimal bail illustrating the surplus created when bail is set at a level equating the 
marginal benefit of release with the marginal cost, see William M. Landes, The Bail System: An Economic 
Approach, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 79, 86-88 (1973) [hereinafter, Landes, Bail System]. 
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low. Such a strategy would not work for bail because each arrestee’s bail is a unique 
good: denying one person bail would not affect the price of another person’s bail. In the 
bail context, the government’s monopoly pricing strategy would be to charge each 
defendant his reservation price (assuming it is above the cost of bail to the government).  
 The consequences will be purely distributional: monopoly will not block socially 
beneficial bail transactions, but will allow the government to keep for itself all the 
benefits. The Bail Clause changes these distributional consequences and ensures that the 
bailee receives some portion of the surplus.154 This is an understandable policy choice for 
the Framers to have made. The government is created to serve the needs of individuals by 
making collective action possible. Thus it should not seek to maximize its own utility at 
the expense of individuals. Thus while bail can be set at a socially optimal level, it should 
not be set any higher. Put differently, the role of the Bail Clause is analogous to that of a 
corporate by-law requiring regular dividend payments.  
 There may be an even more vexing agency problem involved, one that could 
block socially efficient bail transactions and provide an alternate or additional transaction 
cost explanation for the Bail Clause. Society benefits both from convicting criminals and, 
all else equal, from releasing them on bail. An optimal bail system would take into 
account both considerations. But society’s agent, the U.S. Attorney, has a utility function 
that diverges from the principal’s. The prosecutor’s goal is to win convictions. This 
purpose can best be served be keeping all defendants in jail until trial.155 Thus the U.S. 
                                                 
154 See generally, Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedral, supra note 1, at 1099-1101 (discussing relevance 
of distributional concerns to establishment of entitlements). 
155 Indeed, the prosecutor may have a greater chance of winning a conviction if the defendant is not 
released, because it reduces his ability to assist in his defense. See William M. Landes, An Economic 
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. LAW & ECON. 61, 72-32 (1971). 
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Attorney has no obvious incentive to reach a bail deal with any defendant. On the 
contrary, he has an incentive to demand unnecessarily and inefficiently high bail.156 Of 
course, the government must pay for the costs of incarceration, but it is not clear to what 
extent the U.S. Attorney internalizes these costs. Nor is it clear whether he internalizes 
any benefit from the forfeiture of bail posted by defendants who fail to appear. (This 
would depend in part on whether forfeited bail went into the prosecutor’s budget or into 
general court funds.)  
 This again is the government-as-imperfect-agent problem discussed earlier in  
relation to prior restraint.157 In that context, this Article suggested that a liability rule is 
not obviously the response to the problem. However, in the bail context, agency costs 
will regularly be much higher than in prior restraint. The agency problem in prior 
restraint -- the reason the government might refuse to give up its anti-speech entitlement 
even when it would be socially beneficial to do so -- would arise only when the potential 
speech is both arguably unprotected and embarrassing to government officials. Such 
cases are rare, and account for a tiny proportion of the situations where the prior restraint 
doctrine applies. A prosecutor, however, faces his agency problem in every single 
bailable case, because bail and conviction are possibilities in every such case. 
  To conclude, the Eighth Amendment works to prevent prosecutors from using 
their monopoly power to appropriate all of the social benefits from the bail system. This 
function is purely distributional: it does not affect social efficiency. However, if there is a 
significant principal-agent problem with prosecutors such that they care about the social 
benefits of conviction and not the social benefits of bail, then the Bail Clause also works 
                                                 
156 See Landes, Bail System, supra note 153, at 96. 
157 See text accompanying notes 134-137, supra. 
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to ensure that these agency costs do not block socially beneficial transactions. In this 
case, it would have efficiency benefits as well as distributional consequences.  
 3) Flipping the entitlement. 
 Another way to examine the economic purpose of the Excessive Bail Clause is to 
consider why the Constitution’s purposes could not have been served by the opposite 
liability rule. Under such a rule, defendants would be presumptively free until trial, but 
the government could “take” defendants’ entitlement to pretrial liberty by forcibly 
detaining them and paying just compensation.158 The chief difference with this system 
would be in what courts are asked to monetize. Under the present bail system, courts 
attempt to set bail at a level equal to society’s interest in the bailee’s appearing at trial,159 
and possibly its interest in him not committing crimes while released. A reverse bail 
system would have to put a monetary value on the cost of detention to the bailee. The 
amount paid would have to be less than in the present defendant-pays system for 
                                                 
158 A reverse-bail system is admittedly fanciful, and is suggested here purely as a counterfactual 
hypothetical. Scholars have considered similar alternatives to the present bail system. Professor Landes has 
examined the property rule version of a reverse-bail system; under that regime, the defendant could choose 
between remaining and jail while being paid compensation, or going free until trial but not receiving 
compensation. See Landes, Bail System, supra note 153, at 93. A similar scheme was discussed in GORDON 
TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF LAW 194-95 (1971). Landes concludes that such a system would perform at least 
as well as the present one, but “voluntary bail” would be better for those who do not make bail under the 
current system. See Landes, Bail System, supra note 153, at 94-95, 102-03. He also suggests that something 
like the liability rule version of reverse bail would be necessary in some situations. Under reverse bail, 
more dangerous defendants would have to be paid more compensation if they choose to stay in jail; the 
worst offenders could receive “large and possibly infinite” payments. To avoid this, Landes suggests 
modifying the purely voluntary reverse-bail system so that highly-dangerous defendants could be detained 
without their consent, with caps put on the amount of compensation they could receive. See id. at 96. He 
suggests, however, that this would be in tension with the presumption of innocence.  
159 Bail, properly set, is approximately the amount required to secure the defendant’s appearance at trial. 
See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 297 (facs. ed. 1767) (observing 
that government’s “purpose” of securing appearance at trial “is equally answered” through detention or 
bail). For a more refined model, see Landes, Bail System, supra note 153, at 83-86. 
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otherwise it would provide a windfall to dangerous people and flight risks, thus creating a 
significant moral hazard.160 
 Determining the amount to be paid to the defendant would be quite complicated. 
The magnitude of the valuation problem is a consequence of bail protecting several 
different interests, most of them inchoate. Accurate compensation would have to account 
for all them.161 Bail is useful to the defendant because it allows him to be free. But the 
liberty interest is particularly difficult to value.162 The defendant’s wage rate could at best 
be a poor approximation (not the least because most jobs involve non-pecuniary 
compensation, such as enjoyment, higher than that offered by jail time).163 A less obvious 
function of bail is to allow the bailee an opportunity to assist in his own defense by freely 
meeting with counsel and by not having the pallor of the cell upon him when he comes 
before a jury. This interest is even harder to value because it is contingent – if the 
defendant is not given bail and subsequently convicted, it would be hard for a court to 
reconstruct whether his inability to assist in his defense was a necessary ingredient in his 
conviction, or whether he was just factually guilty.  
 It is not clear whether society’s interest in bail is easier for a judge to monetize 
than the individual’s interest.164 However, it is not implausible that the individual’s 
interest will be more difficult to value. Thus the form of the current bail system – a 
liability rule for a detention entitlement originally assigned to the government – could be 
                                                 
160 See id.  
161 See AMAR, supra note 3 (explaining that to determine the proper remedies for Fourth Amendment 
violations, one must first determine the underlying interests it protects). 
162 Part I.C, supra, discusses the particular valuation problems raised by liberty entitlements. 
163 Landes notes that voluntary reverse bail would have the beneficial effect of giving authorities an 
incentive to improve prison conditions, because that would lower the amount of compensation each 
defendant would have to be offered. See Landes, Bail System, supra note 153, at 96-97. 
164 Landes does not consider valuation difficulties for either interest. 
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understood as a response to these asymmetric ex post transaction costs. Finally, liability 
rules may be particularly appropriate for bail because it seeks to accommodate conflicting 
private and public interests within one rule.165 Of course, attempts to reconcile conflicting 
legitimate interests are ubiquitous in the law. In bail, however, the effort is made to 
reconcile these interest within each individual case, not across a wide swath cases. In 
such situations, where a balance must be struck within individual cases, liability rules 
have advantages, as they are more flexible than property rules.166 Injunctions are all-or-
nothing, but money can be more or less, and is thus better suited to fine adjustments 





 Constitutional law has long been regarded as a field where only property rules can 
apply. Yet only two constitutional provisions choose between liability and property, with 
the Takings Clause adopting the former, and as has been show here, the Third 
Amendment adopting the latter. For other entitlements, the Constitution makes no 
explicit choice. This shows that for entitlements where remedies are not specified, both 
options are open, as well as creative mixtures of the two. Thus liability rules are fully 
compatible with the Constitution. 
                                                 
165 Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 719 & n.10 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“Bail, as frequently noted, 
involves a struggle to reconcile competing interests.”), citing Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Note, The Eighth 
Amendment and the Right To Bail: Historical Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 329-30 (1982) (“Bail 
acts as a reconciling mechanism to accomodate [sic] both the defendant's interest in pretrial liberty and 
society's interest in assuring the defendant’s presence at trial.”). 
166 See generally, Kontorovich, supra note 5 at 798-801 (discussing use of liability rules to reconcile 
competing interests in a given case, with particular attention to liberty entitlements). See also, Bell & 
Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 67-68. 
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 The amenability of constitutional entitlements to liability protection is not merely 
a theoretical innovation. Rather, this Article has shown that liability rules are in fact 
found throughout constitutional law. Of course, this Article does not purport to be 
comprehensive: the liability rules identified here do not necessarily exhaust all those that 
can be found in constitutional doctrine. Indeed, there may be constitutional entitlements 
that currently receive property rule protection but that should, under the considerations 
described in this Article, receive liability protection instead. This Article’s identification 
of existing liability rules should be a good point of departure for investigations into 
desirable but not-yet-existing liability rules. 
 The awareness of the second dimension of constitutional law draws attention to 
the economic structure of constitutional remedies – to holdout problems, imperfect 
information, valuation difficulties, agency costs, and related considerations typically 
obscured and overlooked by purely substantive discussions of constitutional rights. 
Determinations about how broad constitutional rights should be are in an important sense 
political or philosophical questions. Economic tools, however, help reveal the best 
methods to enforce already-defined entitlements.   
 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art1
